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ABSTRACT
Every day we rely on public employees to provide us with a
broad range of services necessary to daily life. These workers include
public school teachers, fire and police, emergency medical technicians,
park rangers, nurses just to name a few. As public employees, these
people work for local and state government and they are compensated
by us for their services through the taxes we pay. In general, these are
modestly paid workers who also receive pensions when they retire af-
ter many years of work. Following the financial crisis of 2008-2009,
government retirement trust funds significantly lost value and their
long-term rates of return fell from levels necessary to pay benefits.
With a more accurate assessment, the true costs of honoring these
longstanding retirement promises became much more clearly in focus
and future pension shortfalls appeared imminent. With little political
appetite for raising tax rates to cover this shortage, state and local
governments adopted "pension reforms" to meet the impending fi-
nancial challenges.
Pension reforms were carried out in many states and localities
through legislative and administrative action. While they followed no
uniform pattern, these policy changes had the overall effect of modify-
ing existing public employee retirement rights in a way that reduced
benefits, made benefits more difficult to earn or they completely over-
hauled existing pension systems. Not surprisingly, public employee
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and retiree groups found these changes to be harmful to their retire-
ment expectations and they considered them a breach of trust. In
over 2/3s of our states litigation followed challenging pension reform
policies claiming that they were illegal or unconstitutional in their im-
pairment of pension rights. This struggle is the principal focus of this
article.
After reviewing the history of American public employee pen-
sions, describing the current state of pension systems and setting forth
their structure, this article considers the last decade of litigation to
pension reform policies. In more than 100 state and federal case deci-
sions, workers and retirees have challenged the popularly-supported
policy changes to their pension rights using a variety of legal theories
and forms of argumentation. The review of these cases analyzes them
from a theoretical perspective and it draws conclusions about the ef-
fectiveness of using a litigation strategy to overturn democratically-
adopted employment policies. The overarching conclusion resulting
from this study is that both state and federal courts have overwhelm-
ingly upheld state and local pension reforms and they have refused to
find statutory or constitutional rights violations for government work-
ers. The secondary conclusion is that in order to protect their future
retirement income, these employees must build better popular sup-
port and legislative protection for their contributions to the public
welfare in order to avoid future cutbacks in benefits.
INTRODUCTION
Throughout American history, all levels of government have em-
ployed people to serve the public in a myriad of ways: teachers, police,
fire, and other workers. At the creation of America, private citizens
were asked to support the new country by joining as soldiers in the
army of the rebellious colonies during the Revolutionary War. In ex-
change for this dangerous loyalty, these courageous people were to be
compensated by their colonies and later, by the Continental Congress.
As in modem times, these military "public employees" were offered
current wages and, sometimes, future income with pensions or land in
order to induce their service and to discourage desertion during the
lengthy and dangerous war.' Pension incentives were thought to be
1. Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty-Land-Warrant Application Files, National
Archives and Records Service, pamphlet describing M804 (1974), https://www.archives.gov/files/
research/microfilm/m804.pdf. The practice of offering pensions for soldiers and their widows
was a longstanding practice.
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crucial for the colonies to attract soldiers willing to risk their lives for
this dangerous and uncertain cause. The need for this support was
apparent since injured soldiers could spend their elderly years impov-
erished and disabled by their war injuries. Even then this policy of
attempting to mitigate economic dependence of elderly workers rec-
ognized a public goal of shifting the main responsibility of supporting
older, injured soldiers to the general public and away from the
soldiers and their families.2 Such a policy was thought to be necessary
for the public welfare and, at the same time, humane.
However, then as now, such public promises were easy to make
and, occasionally, they were found to be difficult to honor. Foreshad-
owing today, these promised Revolutionary War benefits were either
not paid in a timely way or, occasionally, they were not paid at all.3
Not surprisingly, this resulted in tremendous dissatisfaction among
soldiers. Over 200 years ago, reneging on military pensions nearly had
catastrophic results and almost triggered a mutiny of colonial officers
threatening the impending colonial military victory.4 In this stark ex-
ample, denying pensions could have affected the course of American
history. These eighteenth century conflicts pitting soldiers against
their government employer anticipated a serious, twenty-first century
problem that is growing in significance - whether, and to what degree,
For more than a century before the beginning of the Revolutionary War, British colonies in
North America provided pensions for disabled soldiers and sailors. During and after the Revo-
lutionary War, three principal types of pensions were provided by the U.S. Government for
servicemen and their dependents. "Disability" or "invalid pensions" were awarded to service-
men for physical disabilities incurred in the line of duty; "service pensions," to veterans who
served for specified periods of time; and "widows' pensions," to women whose husbands had
been killed in the war or were veterans who had served for specified periods of time. Id. at 1.
Following the American Revolution, Thomas Paine called for a land inheritance tax that
that would pay all citizens reaching the age of fifty an annual pension of ten pounds sterling.
Thomas Paine, Social Insurance History, U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, https://
www.ssa.gov/history/paine4.html.
2. See Historical Background and the Development of Social Security, U.S. SOCIAL SECUR-
rry ADMINISTRATION, https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited July 1, 2018).
3. See generally ROBERT L. CLARK ET AL., A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES (2003).
4. Even then promises of current wages and future retirement pensions presented fiscal
demands on the newly-created government that could not be met. See generally EMILY J. TEIPE,
AMERICA'S FIRST VETERANS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR PENSIONS (2002). Colonial gov-
ernment defaults actually enraged the Revolutionary officers and soldiers inspiring them to
threaten the Continental Congress with a virtual mutiny in 1783. Id. This threat was leveled by
officers at a meeting in Newburgh, New York in March of 1783 after soldiers had not been paid
wages for nearly a year. Id. The timely intervention of George Washington quelled this revolt
after an emotional speech known as the Newburgh Address of March 15, 1783, promising to use
his best efforts to have the soldiers' claims met. Id.
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public employers may reduce or change earlier retirement promises
made to their workers.
This article considers the current legal and policy changes that
have been mandated at the state level of government affecting nearly
twenty million American workers and millions of current retirees.
New state policies have far-reaching consequences affecting a surpris-
ingly large component of the American workforce representing al-
most 1-in-8 American employees.5 These are the teachers, police
officers, firefighters, emergency technicians, and other state and local
government workers we are familiar with and upon whom we rely
every day. Having been promised benefits by prior politicians whose
successors would now determine those promises to be too generous,
these workers find themselves facing a less financially secure retire-
ment future than they expected.
Honoring these retirement promises has become a serious prob-
lem across the nation becoming a hotly contested political issue in
many states.6 Since the financial crisis of 2009, legal and policy
changes have been adopted in the face of some extremely alarming
financial predictions about the long-term financial solvency of state
retirement systems.7 Accurate actuarial projections have given more
precision to the extent of this problem with recent estimates of the
current unfunded liabilities of most state and local government pen-
sion ranging from nearly $4 trillion 8 to more than $6 trillion.9 These
5. In 2017, the American civilian, non-institutional workforce numbered approximately
155.5 million workers with state and local government employees comprising 19.54 million or
12.6% of the total. Public teachers and other workers counted for 53% of the state and govern-
mental workers or nearly 7% of the American civilian workforce. Labor Force Statistics from
the Current Population Survey, U.S DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://
www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaatl8b.htm (last updated Jan. 19, 2018).
6. See, e.g., Joel Fox, Is a Battle Brewing Over Prop. 13? L.A. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016); Tina
Sfondeles & Fran Spielman, Pension Battle Between 'Gov. Gridlock' and 'Madigan's Mayor?
Chi. Sun-Times (Jan. 10, 2017), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/city-hall-dubs-rauner-gov-
gridlock-for-pension-bill-stance/; Tom Loftus, Bevin Warns Tax Reform Will be Tough, THE
COURIER-JOURNAL, Feb. 8, 2017, at A2; Tina Sfondeles, 'Frustrated' Rauner to Push for 'Grand
Bargain' in Budget Address, CHm. SuN-Tims( Feb. 14, 2017), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/
frustrated-rauner-to-push-for-grand-bargain-in-budget-address/.
7. The issue of state retirement cutbacks has arisen at the same time when the solvency of
the major federal social benefit programs of Social Security and Medicare affecting millions of
retirees and other recipients has also been questioned. However, this looming federal issue
which currently is unaddressed by our political leaders is beyond the scope of this article.
8. Joshua D. Rauh, Hidden Debt, Hidden Deficits: 2017 Edition: How Pension Promises
Are Consuming State and Local Government Budgets 1, HOOVER INSTITUTION 1, 1 (2017), https:/
/www.hoover.org/research/hidden-debt-hidden-deficits-2017-edition.
9. Thurston Powers et al., Unaccountable and Unaffordable: Unfunded Pension Liabilities
Exceed $6 Trillion, American Legal Exchange Council 1, 3 (2017), https://www.alec.org/app/
uploads/2017/12/2017-Unaccountable-and-Unaffordable-FINALDEC_WEB.pdf.
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staggering sums have grown year to year and they currently represent
twice the general revenues collected by these state and local govern-
ments.10 Put into another perspective, this unfunded pension liability
dwarfs all of the outstanding bonds of these jurisdictions forming an
"off-the-books" debt that governments have refused to recognize."
The realization that state pension plans have offered retirees ben-
efits that may be financially impossible to honor has led numerous
state legislatures to make policy changes and to enact new laws alter-
ing the existing array of public retirement benefits for public workers
and retirees. Justified by limited state and local revenues, by more
compelling public spending priorities, and by an aversion to increasing
taxes, state after state has attempted to rein in these benefits. These
new policies have been highly controversial and have been intensely
resisted by employee groups and retirees.'" The cutbacks on em-
ployee pensions have been the subject of numerous court challenges
in at least 70% of the states.'3 This high level of court challenge re-
flects the deep dissatisfaction of government workers with these new
policies as well as the belief that their trust in their government em-
ployer had been violated.
This article analyzes pension reform challenges occurring over
the past decade in both the state and federal courts. It categorizes the
patterns of legal attack employed to challenge these new policies and
it evaluates the actual legal and constitutional constraints faced by
policymakers in reforming their state's policies. The central questions
presented here are "what are the legal boundaries for public policy
making in this area" and "how does law limit public policy choices?"
This analysis also assesses the litigation outcomes to determine the
relative success of workers resisting lawfully-adopted pension policy
changes. The general conclusion reached from this analysis is that al-
though the law in this area follows no uniform pattern, state govern-
ments have been overwhelmingly successful in defending the changes
even when they have negative effects on workers. Such a conclusion
10. See Rauh, supra note 8, at 3.
11. See Rauh, infra note 43.
12. See Chris Butera, Kentucky Judge Deems Governor's Pension Law Unconstitutional,
Chief Investment Officer, (June 22, 2018), https://www.ai-cio.com/news/kentucky-judge-pension-
law-unconstitutional/louisville-kentucky-usa-2//(describing the challenge to legislation passed in
2018 in Kentucky's pension reform efforts with intense resistance from school teachers to benefit
cuts).
13. Marcia Robiou, How States Have Tried to Close their Pension Funding Gaps,
FRONTUN E (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-states-have-tried-to-
close-their-pension-funding-gaps/.
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runs counter to the commonly-held beliefs of public employees who
think that they have stable and secure pension rights that are free
from subsequent legislative claw back. Such beliefs are incorrect and
unfounded and government pension policy may be adjusted to reduce
benefits when the popular will supports the cutbacks. Employee and
retiree "rights" are truly subject to the changing winds of public opin-
ion and political support.
I. PROVIDING A RETIREMENT INCOME FOR AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT WORKERS
A. Pensions in American History
Post-employment compensation has been an American tradition
for public workers since the founding of our nation. Following the
Revolutionary period, military pensions in some format were pro-
vided to soldiers and sailors throughout the 19th and 20th centuries
and continues to this day.14 The American government and the ser-
vices it provided slowly expanded throughout the 19th century track-
ing the growth of population, the economy and the changing needs of
the nation.5 During this time, the number of public workers ex-
panded and, over time, their functions became familiar and expected
parts of both urban and rural life. As part of this expansion of govern-
mental services, public employers slowly began to provide pensions
first for disability and later for service as a part of employee
compensation.
16
In contrast, private industrial employers adopted retirement ben-
efits much more slowly than did the public sector. Large companies
began to offer pensions first in 1875 by the American Express Com-
pany and later by railroad companies.1 7  Private employers in non-
railway fields were slower to adopt worker pensions but by 1920 many
large employers had started plans." These large employers saw pen-
14. Congress recognized the purposes of offering military pensions as providing replace-
ment income for injured or disabled soldiers, encouraging retirements of older soldiers, and to
attract new recruits into the military service. See generally ROBERT L. CLARK, ET AL., A His-
TORY OF PUBLIC SECrOR PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 43-62, 122-153 (2003).
15. Id.at 128-29.
16. Id.
17. MURRAY WEBB LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA 21-22 (1933). The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company established the second pri-
vate sector etirement plan in 1880 but over the next twenty-five years only twelve more railroad
companies joined in the practice. Id. at 25.
18. Following the railroads, a small number of banks and urban trolley systems offered
pensions as did a small number of manufacturing firms and later large steel and oil & gas compa-
2019]
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sions, along with mandatory retirement ages, as methods of removing
older workers who they believed had reduced productivity without
alienating their remaining employees. Finally, federal government
workers were the last employee group to be covered by a comprehen-
sive pension system, only gaining that benefit in 1920.19 Gradually,
over the 20th century, the concept of employers making specific provi-
sion for workers' post-employment income became a common indus-
trial practice of large employers and a broadly-accepted popular ideal.
B. Expanding Public Pensions: Police, Firefighters and Teachers
Cities began to provide retirement income for their employees in
the 19th century. Public employee pensions began at the local govern-
ment encompassing three discrete categories of workers: police, fire
fighters and teachers. In 1857 the New York City became the first
municipality to provide disability pensions for its police officers in-
jured in the line of duty.20 Twenty-one years later this benefit was ex-
panded to provide police retirement pensions based on service.21 Not
surprisingly, firefighters, who were increasingly important to the
safety of growing American cities, soon began to receive similar com-
pensation to that of police and they were also recruited and compen-
sated with pensions similar to those of police.22 This phenomenon
began in the growing American cities where these public safety work-
ers were necessary to provide a desirable, safe, and orderly urban life.
ies. Id. at 39-41 (mentioning Carnegie Steel and Standard Oil). Some large firms including
U.S. Steel, General Electric, AT&T, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, Bethlehem Steel, American
Can, and Eastman Kodak had pensions by 1930. See CHARLES ELLIS ET AL., FALLING SHORT:
THE COMING RETIREMENT CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO, 130-31 n. 9 (2014).
19. The Federal Employees Retirement Act, enacted on May 22, 1920, promised minimum
pensions that were small by modern standards ($180 to $360 per year) but provided income
security even during the Depression. At that time approximately 3 million American private,
nonfarm workers (13% of the total) were covered by private pension plans. ROBERT L. CLARK
ET AL., supra note 3, at 154, 163-64.
20. In 1858 there were over 1400 police covered by a New York City pension plan which
was called the Police Life and Health Insurance Fund. The funding of this early pension system
was composed of a motley combination of sources including permits for dancing schools, boxing
contests, street entertainment, fees for physician and private detective licenses, dog tag fees,
unclaimed property, and fines imposed on police officers for disciplinary infractions. See ROB-
ERT L. CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 175.
21. In 1878 New York City's plan began to provide a retirement pension to police officers of
one-half of final pay upon completion of twenty-one years of service. Id. at 167. After New York
City, the cities of Chicago, Detroit, Indianapolis and St. Louis joined in having police pensions.
See ROBERT L. CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, Table 10.1(list of municipal police pensions and their
features in 1920). This list substantially grew by the beginning of the 20th century. Id. at 176.
22. Id. at Table 10.2.
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In addition to urban public safety workers, school teachers were
also early recipients of pensions. American public education expanded
quickly in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the number of
students attending public schools nearly tripling from 1870 to 1920.23
Not surprisingly, the number of teachers, employed by city or county
governments, grew to reach high levels over a relatively short period
of time.2 4 Funded and organized in local communities, public schools
first provided a structured elementary education to American children
and later, in the 20th century, expanded to give a high school educa-
tion to pupils training them as workers for the industrial workforce.
Pensions for public school teachers became increasingly common as a
component of the employee's compensation package. By the begin-
ning of the 20th century, nearly one-third of all American teachers
had pension rights and by 1916, 33 states had some retirement system
for their public school teachers.26 By 1930 at least 12 major cities also
had pension plans for their teachers.2 7 Today, state and local govem-
ment educational employment have the largest number of public em-
ployees at any level of government constituting nearly 7% of the total
American civilian workforce.2' This pattern of broad pension cover-
age for public school teachers and continues to the present.
C. Extending Retirement Income to Other Public Workers
During this period other government employees were less fortu-
nate. By 1930 only 6 states had established pension plans for their
non-education or public safety workers. Massachusetts led the nation
23. The Statistical Abstract of the United States reported the number of students enrolled
in public school students rising from about 7.5 million in 1871 to 20.8 million in 1918- an increase
of 277%. Education No. 73. - Summary of School Population, BUREAU OF EDUC., DEP'T OF
INTERIOR, (July 15, 2018) https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/1921/compendialstatab/
43ed/1920-03.pdf.
24. In the post-Civil War period the1880 Statistical Abstract of the United States registered
220,225 public school teachers for 7.5 million students in 1871. Id. By 1900 the number of teach-
ers had grown to 415,660 with an enrolled student population of 15.1 million. This represented a
growth of teachers of 89% and pupils of 100%. Id. The next 20 years would show a growth in
public school teachers to 650,709 (56.5% increase) and public-school students to 20.8 million
(38%). Id.
25. Claudia Goldin, A Brief History of Education in the United States 10-11, National Bu-
reau of Economic Research, (Aug., 1999) www.nber.org/papers/hOll9.pdf.
26. WILLIAM GRAEBNER, A HISTORY OF RETiREmENT-THE MEANING AND FUNCTION OF
AN AMERICAN INsTrrTUTION, 1885-1978 at 93 (1980). Professor Graebner noted that "most [of
these school systems] were in the Midwest and Northeast, were statewide, and the same number
were contributory- supported by both public and private (teacher) contributions." Id.
27. CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 182, Table 10.4, 188; Table 10.5.
28. See supra note 5.
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by adopting its pension plan for all state workers in 1911.29 The Mas-
sachusetts plan which also required employee contribution served as a
model for other states and cities and was considered by Congress
when it created the federal Civil Service retirement system in 1920.30
As the concept of retirement income replacement in the form of pen-
sions became more pervasive in the public sector, states and localities
began to offer their workers' pension often in conjunction with the
federal Social Security retirement benefit. The economic Depression
of the 1930s focused political support behind the idea of a publicly-
provided old age pension and in 1935 Congress established the Social
Security system providing retirement benefits for workers.31
Initially, state and local employees were excluded from Social Se-
curity coverage. Following World War II there was a continued ex-
pansion of state and local governmental activities resulting in the
increase in public workers. The Social Security pension system ex-
panded during these years and by 1960 it reached nearly 80% of the
nation's workers.32 In the decade of the 1950s, Social Security was
extended to include state public sector employers and, by 1961, most
states had their own public pension plans with most also providing
Social Security coverage.33 At that time a number of states chose to
exit Social Security making their state and local plans the exclusive
retirement benefit for workers.34 Recent changes have cut back these
29. The six states were Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and
Pennsylvania and by 1930 they covered nearly 30,000 state employees who were not school
teachers. CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 201-02, Table 10.6.
30. KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-972, Federal Employees' Retirement
System: Summary of Recent Trends 1 (2018).
31. Congress passed the Social Security Act (P.L. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620) on August 14, 1935
to provide retirement security for American workers. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C § 1 (1935).
This law was a part of the New Deal legislation during the Depression of the 1930s. Larry
DeWitt, The Development of Social Security in America, 70 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN No. 3
(2010). In its initial scope, the law only applied to approximately 43% of the American
workforce and it was structured much like a private insurance plan paying benefits from a dedi-
cated trust fund. Id. Amendments in 1939 significantly changed the program by adding depen-
dent and survivor benefits making Social Security a family economic security program without a
clear source of employee contributions supporting the added benefits. Id. at Table 2.
32. See DORA L. COSTA, THE EVOLUTION OF RETIREMENT: AN AMERICAN ECONOMIC HiS-
TORY 174 (Claudia Goldin ed. 1998).
33. OLIVIA S. MITCHELL & GARY ANDERSON, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIRE-
MENT SYSTEMS 9-10 (2009).
34. In 1991, Congress made Social Security coverage mandatory for state and local govern-
ment employees except those participating in a public retirement system. As a result, some
states with these systems opted out of Social Security making the state retirement benefit the
primary source of retirement income. It has been estimated that 25% of state and local govern-
ment workers do not have Social Security coverage but must rely on state pensions with teachers
faring even worse. In 2013 a study noted,
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Cutting Pension Rights for Public Workers
state and local pensions have made these workers even more vulnera-
ble since they do not also have Social Security. It is this cutting back
of state and local retirement benefits that are the subject of this
article.
II. MODERN STATE AND LOCAL RETIREMENT
PENSION SYSTEMS
A. State Autonomy in Pension Policy Making
States are largely free to fashion the terms and conditions of em-
ployment for their workers. Labor market conditions and longstand-
ing payment practices guide the government employers in formulating
their compensation policies. Each state determines the legal structure
and the funding mechanism of its own employee pension plan and
they maintain near-total autonomy in devising their state policy. Not
surprisingly, there is no uniform federal law driving the policy discus-
sion and, importantly, there is no federal mandate requiring any state-
level retirement benefits or any kind of benefit protection.35 When
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)36 it was responding to failures of private sector pension
Teachers constitute one of the largest groups of uncovered workers. Nationwide, ap-
proximately 1.2 million teachers (about 40 percent of all public K-12 teachers) are not
covered. Those teachers are concentrated m 15 states- Alaska, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Nevada, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Texas-and the District of Columbia, where many or
all public school teachers neither pay into nor receive benefits from the system.
See Leslie Kan & Chad Alderman, Uncovered: Social Security, Retirement Uncertainty and 1
Million Teachers, Teacher Pensions, 1 (2014), https://www.teacherpensions.org/sites/default/files/
UncoveredReportFinal.pdf. Not only is the absence of Social Security a major problem for
teachers but also those working in states having teacher pension programs receive little or no
benefits due to worker mobility, vesting rules and policies favoring ultra-long term employees.
Id. at 7.
35. In fact, the main federal law governing retirement policy- ERISA- does not apply to
state and local government retirement benefits. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29
U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (1974). Section 4(b)(1) of ERISA provides that Title I of ERISA does not
apply to an employee benefit plan that is a "governmental plan" as defined in ERISA §3(32). Id.
ERISA §3(32) defines a governmental plan as "a plan established or maintained for its employ-
ees by the Government of the United States, by the government of any State or political subdivi-
sion thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing." Id. at § 3(32).
36. The U.S. Department of Labor describes the general scope of ERISA in the following
terms:
ERISA is a Federal law that sets standards of protection for individuals in most volun-
tarily established, private-sector retirement plans. ERISA requires plans to provide
participants with plan information, including important facts about plan features and
funding; sets minimum standards for participation, vesting, benefit accrual, and fund-
ing; provides fiduciary responsibilities for those who manage and control plan assets;
requires plans to establish a claims and appeals process for participants to get benefits
from their plans; gives participants the right to sue for benefits and breaches of fiduci-
ary duty; and if a defined benefit plan is terminated, guarantees payment of certain
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plans and not public plans.37 The law required private-sector retire-
ment plans to satisfy minimum coverage, participation, vesting, fund-
ing, and fiduciary requirements as a means of improving retirement
income security for employees. However, ERISA intentionally ex-
cluded government pension plans from important sections of the stat-
ute.38 Concerns about federalism values and the limits of federal
legislative authority persuaded Congress not to extend ERISA to the
states. 39 As a result, even after ERISA was enacted there has been no
nationally-consistent rule structure for sub-federal governmental re-
tirement plans.4" Without the discipline of uniform federal pension
program rules imposing uniform standards, state and local pension
plans have been structured and administered under state law follow-
ing state and local political direction.4 This autonomy has had highly
varied results: benefitting some state and local government workers
benefits through a Federally chartered corporation, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration (PBGC).
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/
topic/retirement/erisa (last visited on July 14, 2018).
37. In 1963 bankrupt carmaker Studebaker Motors closed its South Bend, Indiana plant.
James A. Wooten, 'The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business:' The Studebaker-Packard
Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BuFF. L. REv. 683, 683-84 (2001). It took Congress
eleven years to enact ERISA establishing private sector pension rules and creating the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which provided insurance to protect worker benefits should a
pension plan end with insufficient assets. See id. at 684.
38. 29 U.S.C. §1003(b)(1) ("The provisions of this [title] shall not apply to any employee
benefit plan if-such plan is a governmental plan (as defined in §1002(32) ..."). Additionally,
ERISA § 1002(32) provides that, "The term 'governmental plan' means a plan established or
maintained for its employees by the Government of the United States, by the government of any
State or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of any of the forego-
ing." Id. § 1002(32).
39. In Rose v. Long Island R.R. Pension Plan, the Second Circuit added 3 other reasons:
The governmental plan exemption [to ERISA] was included for several reasons. First,
it was generally believed that public plans were more generous than private plans with
respect to their vesting provisions. Second, it was believed that "the ability of the gov-
ernmental entities to fulfill their obligations to employees through their taxing powers"
was an adequate substitute for both minimum funding standards and plan termination
insurance. Finally, there was concern that imposition of the minimum funding and
other standards would entail unacceptable cost implications to governmental entities.
Rose v. Long Island R.R. Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1987).
40. Paul M. Secunda, Litigating for the Future of Public Pensions, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1353,
1363-64 (2014) (author noting that "Federalism concerns also played a dispositive role as far as
Congress not trying to assume power over public plans.").
41. Noting this difference, two observers have written that a pension plan subject to ERISA
"must design, structure, and fund its plan in accordance with federal rules," whereas public pen-
sion plans "are largely free to structure their pension plans as they see fit and are not subject to
any funding requirements other than what state law might impose." Amy B. Monahan & Renita
K. Thukral, Federal Regulation of State Pension Plans: The Governmental Plan Exemption Revis-
ited, 28 A.B.A. J. LAB.& EMP. L. 291, 292 (2013). See also Amy B. Monahan, State Fiscal
Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public Pensions, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 127-28
("state and local plans are exempt from [ERISA] .. , and therefore it is entirely up to a state or
city to determine how it will fund its pension plans").
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with well-run and sufficiently-funded plans while employees in other
jurisdictions facing substantial uncertainty about their post-retirement
future due to poor plan design and funding. Some commentators
have even recommended the extension of ERISA or ERISA-like
rules to apply to these governmental retirement systems,42 but as of
now, none of these recommendations has been implemented.
This decentralized state control over pension design and funding,
as well as the absence of uniform plan requirements, has had widely
disparate effects on the sustainability of state pension plans and their
ability to meet future pension payments. Some states have consist-
ently funded their retirement systems adequately to provide a high
degree of coverage for future pension costs.4 3 Others have made in-
adequate annual payments or have even completely skipped making
yearly contributions when it was expedient to do so.' This state au-
tonomy has provided each state with the independence to fashion its
own response to the financial aspects of operating their retirement
systems. These responses have run the gamut of being courageous,
well-designed, ill-informed, and in some cases truly dishonest. All
have been highly controversial.45
The recent state legal and policy changes have been adopted in
the face of some alarming financial predictions. In 2017, state and
local government retirement systems controlled $3.96 trillion in finan-
cial assets in trust funds for workers' pensions.46 However as sizable
as these funds appear, the Federal Reserve calculated that these pen-
sion entitlements were underfunded by 32% in 2017.4' Analysts fear
42. Paul M. Secunda, supra note 40, at 1402-04.
43. Powers, supra note 9, at 3; Six states have reported exemplary pension funding ratios
exceeding 90%. These include: South Dakota (100%); Wisconsin (100%); Tennessee (99%);
New York (95%); North Carolina (94%); and Nebraska (91%). Id. at 12. These high coverage
ratios fell considerably when future pension liabilities were assessed using risk free discount
rates. Id.
44. Id. at 3. Five states demonstrated weak pension fund coverage ratios of less than 50%.
These include: Kentucky (44%); Connecticut (47%); Illinois (47%); Mississippi (54%); and Ha-
waii (55%). Id. at 8.
45. See K.C. Becker, Putting PERA on a Path to Prosperity, DENVER POST (June 15, 2018,
12:13 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/06/15/putting-pera-on-a-path-to-prosperity/.; Blake
Brickman, AG Andy Beshear's Lawsuit Threatens Future of Kentucky Teachers' Pensions, Ky.
(June 13, 2018, 6:36 PM), https://www.kentucky.com/opinion/op-ed/article2l3O57319.html.
46. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. Sys., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS,
FIRST QUARTER 9 (2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20170608/zl.pdf.
47. Id. The Society of Actuaries analyzed 130 state and large city public pension plans cov-
ering 27 million workers and retirees and concluded that the unfunded liability in this sample
was 27% in 2014. Soc'y OF ACTUARIES, U.S. PUBLIC PENSION PLAN CONTRIBUTION INDICES,
2006-2014, (2017), https://www.soa.org/research-reports/2017/public-pension-indices.
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that existing retirement trust funds in some states may be so seriously
underfunded that they may not be able to provide the retirement pay-
ments promised to workers.48 Although the health of these plans is
unevenly distributed across the nation, the overall shortfall is truly as-
tounding reaching trillions of dollars.4 9 So large are these shortfalls, in
some states, that the financial health of the entire state and major lo-
calities has also been called into question.50 Some analysts have pre-
dicted catastrophic effects without changes in current policies,51 while
others have concluded that sizable shortfalls will be avoidable with
careful pension plan management and judicious modifications.52 With
pension expenses growing so quickly, legislators view pension costs as
crowding out other budget priorities. This realization has motivated
the recent policy changes.
Regarding pension reforms, states and local governments have
sorted themselves into three broad categories. Group One jurisdic-
tions are those that have invested in expert assessments of the pension
funds current condition and future glide path. These places are well-
48. State and local government pensions represent a huge future liability. Recent estimates
have estimated the future unfunded liability of state and local government pensions to be $4
trillion and some think that these liabilities have been greatly underestimated. Robert Novy-
Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They
Worth?, 66 J. FiN. 1207, 1207-08 (2010). Viewing these governmental pension promises as de-
ferred compensation and a debt of governmental employers, this number dwarfs all existing state
and local bond liability by a 4 to 1 ratio.
49. See PEW CHARTABLE TRUST, The State Pensions Funding Gap: Challenges Persist 8
(2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/07/pewstates-statepensiondebt
brief_final.pdf; Powers, supra note 9, at 12.
50. The State of Illinois presents the most vivid current conflict between a state's governor
and legislature with its employee unions and its Supreme Court. See Bruce J. McNeil & Jack E.
Karns, Illinois Supreme Court Deal Says to the Government: The Price is Right for the Pension
Prize, J. Pension Planning & Comp. 35-65 (2015); David R. Godofsky & Emily Hootkins, Illi-
nois Supreme Court Affirms Constitutional Protection of State Pensions, 28 BENEFITS L.J. 79
(2015).
51. George F. Will, America's Utterly Predictable Tsunami of Pension Problems, WASH.
POST (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/Opinions/americas-utterly-predictable-
tsunami-of-pension-problems/2017/02/22/le5deOOe-f869-11e6-9845-57669081518-story.htmI
(claiming that each American household is responsible for $19,000 government pension debt).
52. One recent analysis concluded that the total costs for the long term commitments of
pensions, other post-employment benefits and government debt service "appear under control in
many jurisdictions." A number of states, counties and cities are facing a much more extreme
future where they must raise taxes, cut spending significantly or hope for much higher invest-
ment returns. Alicia H. Munnel & Jean-Pierre Aubry, Will Pensions and OPEBs Break State
and Local Budgets at 6, CTR. FOR REaiREMrarEr REs. (Oct. 2016), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-eontent/
uploads/2016/10/slp_51.pdf (pension costs >30% of state revenue in Illinois and only 1% in
Wisconsin).
53. See e.g., Joe Nation, Pension Math: Public Pension Spending and Service Crowd Out in
California, 2003-2030, STANFORD INST. FOR ECON. POL'Y RvS. (Oct. 2, 2017), https://
siepr.stanford.edusites/default/files/publications/17-023-l.pdf.
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informed and have taken financially responsible action. They have
attempted to shore up the financial underpinnings of their existing re-
tirement systems with increased employer and employee contributions
to their pension fund,54 and they have made necessary administrative
changes to their fund management that will likely keep them well
positioned.55 Some have even issued long term pension bonds to
shore up their pension funds.56
Group Two jurisdictions are well-informed but they are not finan-
cially responsible. These places have received clear actuarial informa-
tion about necessary financial steps that they should take to provide
for timely pension payments, but they have not taken the hard steps to
add to pension reserves. Unfortunately, in these states' policies, au-
tonomy has permitted short-term political judgments to ignore the
clear path dictated by actuarial projections requiring increased current
contributions to return to the proper financial path.57 Through this
non-action, these states have delayed the difficult, yet necessary, steps
needed to be taken to solidify their public pension plans enabling
them to perform as promised for workers.58 The promises made so
54. In Great Britain, the Bank of England, a governmental entity, was forced to pay 55% of
its payroll in 2016 on pension costs to offset unfunded liability caused by falling bond interest
rates and the drop in stock prices following the nation's Brexit vote. Pensions: Fade to Grey,
Ti- ECONOaIST Working Paper No. 17-023, (Sept. 24, 2016), https://www.economist.com/brief-
ing/2016/09/24/fade-to-grey.
55. In New Jersey, the 2018 budget contained a $2.5 billion contribution to the state's pen-
sion fund representing a 35% increase from the prior year and added the New Jersey State
Lottery as a pension system asset going forward. The state's treasurer estimated that the lottery
would add $37 billion to the pension system over the next 30 years and improve the pension
fund's funding ratio by 14%. See Robert Steyer, New Jersey Approves Budget, Shifting State
Lottery Pension Fund, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (July 5,2017), https://www.pionline.com/article
/20170705/ONLINE/170709972/new-jersey-approves-budget-shifting-state-lottery-to-pension-
fund.
56. Houston, Texas was one jurisdiction to issue $1 billion in pension obligation bonds after
receiving voter approval in late 2017. See Newsmakers, Houston issues $1 Billion in Pension
Obligation Bonds, CHIEF INVESTMENT OFFICER (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.ai-cio.com/news/
houston-issues-l-billion-pension-obligation-bonds/.
57. The most common tactic employed by retirement fund managers to understate the de-
gree of their plan's underfunding is to calculate the present value of future benefits while using a
discount rate that is higher than private plans and higher than might be reasonably obtainable
with investments over future fund growth. See Jeffrey R. Brown & David W. Wilcox, Discount-
ing State and Local Pension Liabilities, 99 Am. ECON. REv. 538, 539-542 (2009); Donald J. Boyd
& Peter J. Kiernan, The Blinken Report: Strengthening the Security of Public Sector Defined
Benefit Plans 2-23, THE NELSON ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOvERNMENT (Jan. 2014), http://rock-
inst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2014-01-Blinken Report_- One.pdf.
58. See Michael Martz, With Investment Income Key- Richmond Retirement System Faces
Funding Challenges, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH (Aug. 20, 2016), http://www.richmond.com/
news/local/city-of-richmond/article_9caa46a8-288e-50bb-b5da-0f972ba13e62.html) (noting un-
funded liabilities and poor investment returns over two years much below assumed discount rate
of 7.5%).
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easily in the past are not dealt with and the financial obligation is
treated as a future problem.59
Group Three jurisdictions have received the same actuarial pre-
dictions of needed change to their employee retirement benefit
problems. However, these places have taken another approach to the
problem: they have taken legislative steps to reduce the state's future
retirement benefit liability by making significant pension for new and,
sometimes, existing workers through pension plan and retirement
benefit changes.6" It is the litigation challenging these recent legal and
policy changes that constitute the main focus of this article.
B. Governmental Retirement Pensions Formats
At present, about 69% of all American workers have access to
some form of employer-sponsored retirement system with only 28%
having the defined benefit option.61 In the private sector, defined
benefit pensions have definitely become much less common. In com-
parison, approximately 90% of state and local government employees
receive retirement benefits with 84% having the defined benefit op-
tion.62 This striking difference reflects the departure of the private
sector away from the defined benefit (DB) format and its gradual shift
towards the defined contribution (DC) method like the popular
401(k) accounts where any pension would be offered.6" Fluctuating
employer contributions and the relatively higher employer costs were
59. In Booth v. Sims, the West Virginia Supreme Court identified the central political prob-
lem with the public pensions when it wrote, "[i]t is a recurrent problem of government that
today's elected officials curry favor with constituents by promising benefits that must be deliv-
ered by tomorrow's elected officials." In reality these "promised benefits" must be paid for by
future tax paying residents, not the future elected officials. Booth v. Sims, 456 S.E.2d 167, 183
(W. Va. 1994).
60. See infra pp. 36-42.
61. Thomas E. Perez, National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in the United
States, March 2015, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., tbl.2 (Sept. 2015), https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/
benefits/2015/ebb10057.pdf.
62. Government employees do not receive this retirement benefit for free; rather, on aver-
age, they must contribute 6.9% of their annual earnings to their pension plan. Higher paid
workers and teachers, on average, contribute even more at 7.4% and 7.7% respectively. Id. at
tbl.4.
63. Karen Steffen, State Employee Pension Plans in PENSIONS IN Tm PUBLIC SECTOR
(Olivia S. Mitchell & Edwin C. Hustead eds.) (2001); See also Workers with Pension Coverage by
Type of Plan, 1983, 1992, 2001, 2013, CTR FOR RET. RES. AT BOSTON COL. (Sept. 2014), http://
crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/1012/01/figure-15.pdf.; In the private sector defined benefit pen-
sion plans provides benefits to significantly fewer private employees over the last two decades
(35% tol7%) with only 10% of private employers offering it. See The Last Private Industry
Pension Plans, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT. (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2013/
ted_20130103.htm.
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the driving forces behind this shift towards defined contribution pen-
sions.64 Running contrary to the private sector, it became the 20th
century practice to bundle defined benefit retirement income into
government workers' compensation packages primarily to attract and
retain higher-quality workers.65 It was also thought that public em-
ployment compensation should contain retirement income in order to
avoid the earlier social ill of having impoverished elderly citizens.
However, in recent times these governments have begun to follow the
private sector practice by significantly shifting away from defined ben-
efit pensions and moving towards the defined contribution or hybrid
models for new workers.
C. Comparing the Features of Defined Benefit and Defined
Contribution Pension Plans
In order to fully appreciate the extent of the serious financial
problem confronting American states and localities, it is necessary to
understand the structural design of most governmental pension sys-
tems. As a general matter, retirement income is provided through two
major forms of pension plans: 1) Defined Benefit (DB) plans and 2)
Defined Contribution (DC) plans.66 The basic differences between
these two pension formats are straightforward and easily under-
stood.67 The following chart summarizes the differences:
1. Defined Benefit Pension Plans
a. Representing a traditional pension format offered by
employers.
b. Guarantees a specific pension amount based on a formula con-
sidering longevity of service and average final salary.
64. Beyond the Numbers: Retirement Costs for Defined Benefit Plans Higher Than for De-
fined Contribution Plans, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT. (Dec. 2012), https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/
volume-1/pdf/retirement-costs-for-defined-benefit-plans-higher-than-for-defined-contributin-
plans.pdf (defined benefit/defined contribution plans compared at $2.53/$1.46 per employee
hour).
65. Alice H. Munnell et al., Recruiting and Retaining High-Quality Workers: Do Pensions
Matter? Ctr. for Ret. Res. at Boston Coll., Working Paper 2015-1 (2015) (explaining that reduc-
tions in benefits could lead to a reduction in the maintenance of a high quality work force).
66. See generally Erik Carter, Choosing Between A Defined Benefit and Defined Contribu-
tion Retirement Plan, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
financialfinesse/2018/09/16/should-you-choose-a-defined-benefit-or-defined-contribution-plan/
#742d64c567ca.
67. See Barbara A. Butrica et al., The Disappearing Defined Benefit Pension and its Poten-
tial Impact on the Incomes of Baby Boomers, Soc. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/policy/
docs/ssb/v69n3/v69n3pl.html (last visited July 2, 2018).
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c. The employer and the employee contribute to the plan during
the period of employment.
d. An employer-managed fund for paying future retirement bene-
fits is established with contributions to pre-fund future pension
payments.
e. The employer manages the pension fund investing the fund as-
sets to grow them over time in order to reach a level sufficient to pay
future promised pension benefits.
f. Employer assumes the risk that contributed fund assets and
their investment growth will be adequate to pay future pension liabili-
ties when they must be paid.
2. Defined Contribution Retirement Plan
a. This format represents the modern trend in private and public
retirement benefit plans and is found in § 401(k), § 403(b), and § 457
plans.
b. The employer and the employee make annual contributions to
the employee's retirement fund often set as a fixed percentage of the
employee's annual salary.
c. The retirement fund investment decisions are made by the em-
ployee without control or responsibility of the employer.
d. The employee generally has a portable retirement account that
follows the employee's employment and may be combined other with
similar accounts.
e. The employee's retirement income is determined by the
amounts contributed over time, the retirement fund investment
choices, the length of pre-retirement employment and the long-term
growth of the retirement fund investments.
f. Once annual contributions have been funded by the employer,
there is no continuing employer obligation to guaranty any retirement
benefit amount and no employer responsibility for providing future
retirement income.
Modelled after the early private sector industrial corporation
pensions, the public workers have been covered with the defined ben-
efit pension described in the discussion above. Generous provisions
obligating the governmental employers to pay lifetime retirement
pensions often with health insurance benefits have made the defined
benefit pension a costly employment benefit. As indicated, the em-
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ployer bears all of the financial risk when offering employees defined
benefit pensions.
D. A Snapshot of Public Workers
In May 2018 the American civilian labor force numbered approx-
imately 161.5 million people with about 155.5 million in full or part-
time employment.6" Of this number, 153 million were employed as
non-agricultural salaried workers in full-time jobs with another 2.3
million agricultural workers.69 State and local government employees
numbered 19.5 million representing about 13% of the 153 million ci-
vilian employees;7" more than half of them worked as educators,
school administrators and non-instructional support personnel, re-
flecting the large employment in K-12 education.71 Other job catego-
ries employed by state and local governments in large numbers ran
the gamut of police and corrections officers, firefighters, hospital and
public health employees, transportation workers and social workers.7 2
In our daily lives we come into contact with many of these govern-
ment workers who often supply vital services necessary to the normal
functioning of modern life.
The main characteristics of this work force differ from those in
the private sector in a number of interesting ways. The personal at-
tributes of these government workers paint a picture of an older, more
female, more racially and ethnically diverse and more highly educated
68. Bureau of Lab. Stat., U.S. Dep't of Lab., Employment Situation Summary, tbLB (2018),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm.
69. Id. at tbl.A-8.
70. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATbON - JUNE, 2018, USDL-18-
0916, Establishment Data Table B-1 (2018). Nearly 8 million people worked in local government
education while 2.4 million were employed in education at the state level. The U.S. collectively
spends $664.7 billion per year on K-12 education with California, New York and Texas leading
the way. See U.S. Census, 2016 Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, Table 1.
Summary of Public Elementary-Secondary School System Finances by State: Fiscal Year 2016
(last visited on 07/04/18 at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/econlschool-finances/secon-
dary-education-finance.html.; Education, both public and private, is a major employer with
nearly 13.8 million workers in 2017 representing almost 9% of the American workforce. See U.S.
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT, Labor Force Statistics for the CPS, chart 18b (last visited on 07/04/18 at
https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaatl8b.htm).
71. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., EMPLOYMENT SYrUATION SUMMARY, JUNE 1, 2018,
USDL-18-0916, Table A-i, (last visited on 07/04/18) The lion's share of these educational em-
ployees work at the local government level (7.9 million) with 2.4 million serving at the state
level. Id. See also "Where do state and local government employees work?" See U.S. Census
Bureau, 2013 Annual Survey of Public Employment & Payroll., (last visited on 07/04/18), https://
www.census.gov/content/dam/ Census/library/visualizations/2015/econ/gl3-aspep-visual.pdf).
72. Id. Educational workers dominate public employment constituting 10 times the number
of the next numerous category- workers who work in hospitals.
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work force than that which is found in the private employment. In
terms of age, 52.1% of local government workers and 49.7% of state
workers were between the ages of 45 and 64 while 42.4% of private
sector employees were in this age range.73  Considering public educa-
tion, the median age of K-12 teachers was 44.774 with 25.5% of them
being 55 years old or older.75 By comparison, the overall median age
of all American workers was 42.2 years with 23% being 55 years old
or older.76 Public workers are disproportionately female (57.7%), a
fact perhaps reflecting the emphasis of public school workers in local
employment, while overall 46.9% of American workers are female.77
As for racial characteristics, full-time public school workers are 82.7%
are white, 11.8% are African American, and 13% are Hispanic while
overall U.S. employees are 78.4% white, 12.1% African American,
and 16.9% Hispanic.78 In terms of educational attainment, over three
quarters of government workers have a college degree or some col-
lege education with 50.9% possessing a college degree and an addi-
tional 26.7% with at least some college education.79 As a whole,
private sector workers have significantly fewer college degrees with
35% in 2015.80
One important difference between the two groups of employees
is the comparison in cash compensation where in 2017 state and local
government employees had an average salary of $53,352 while private
sector workers had an average of $55,338.84.81 Differences between
73. Gerald Mayer, Selected Characteristics of Private and Public Sector Workers 8, FEDERA-
TION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (Mar. 21, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41897.pdf. Female
local government workers also were found to have a statistically greater longevity than private
sector employees but that was largely attributed to those workers having a higher level of educa-
tion which is positively correlated to longer life. Alicia H. Munnell, Does Mortality Differ Be-
tween Public and Private Sector Workers, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT B.C., fig.2 (2015), http://
crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/slp_44.pdf.
74. Joshua Franzel, The State and Local Workforce: Analysis and Forecast, GOV'T FIN. REV.
46, 47 (June 2015), http://www.gfoa.org/sites/default/files/615GFR46.pdf.
75. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey- Household Data Annual
Averages, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., tbl.18b (2018), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaatl8b.htm.
76. Id.
77. John Schmitt, Wage Penalty for State and Local Government Employees 3, CTR. FOR
ECON. AND POL'Y RES. (May 2010), http://cepr.net/documents/publications/wage-penalty-2010-
05.pdf.
78. Id.
79. Schmitt, supra note 78, at 3.
80. Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private Sector Employee 2011-2015 6,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (Apr. 2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/ll5th-congress-
2017-2018/reports/52637-federalprivatepay.pdf.
81. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT, QUARTERLY CENSUS OF EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES TA-
BLES PRrVATE OWNERSIHP, STATE GOVERNMENT, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2016) available at
https://www.bls.gov/cew/cewbultncur.htm. The state and local government annual average repre-
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public and private employees continue to be observed when non-cash
benefits are considered but the overall balance shifts in favor of the
public workers where benefits, including those for retirement, make a
noticeable difference.82 Ninety-one percent of state and local employ-
ees have access to pension plans and 80% participate with a large
number having access to defined benefit programs and participating.83
Currently, there are 14.7 million contributing members and 6.3 million
current beneficiaries to state and local pension systems.84 By compar-
ison, in the private sector, only 48% of employers offer any retirement
benefits with most defined contribution plans. With these numbers
in mind, it is not surprising that current workers, both public and pri-
vate, have serious concerns about their post-retirement living
standards.8 6
sents a 40%/60% averaging of state compensation ($57,168) and local compensation ($48,440).
U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT, QUARTERLY CENSUS OF EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES TABLES PRI-
VATE OWNERSHIP, STATE GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2017) available at https://
www.bls.gov/cew/cewbultnl7.htm. The state and local government annual average represents a
40%/60% averaging of state compensation ($58,802) with local government compensation
($49,720) in proportion to the number of workers. Id.
82. In 2017, full time private sector workers had total hourly compensation of $33.26 per
hour worked with state and local government workers earning $48.06 per hour worked. The
major differences was in benefit costs earned where the public workers had 37.3% of their com-
pensation in benefits while the private employees had only 30.4% of their compensation bene-
fits. This was a substantial difference resulting in $7.83 per hour more compensation public
workers. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT, EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION-
JUNE, 2017 available at https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_09082017.pdf.
83. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT, RETIREMENT BENEFITS: ACCESS, PARTICIPATION, AND
TAKE-UP RATES (Mar. 2017), https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2017/ownership/govt/tableO2
a.htm. A large part of the remainder have access to defined contribution programs.
84. Phillip M. Vidal, Annual Survey of Public Pensions: State- and Locally-Administered
Defined Benefit Data Summary Brief: 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2 (2017), https://
www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/econ/gl6-aspp-sl.pdf. Average
teacher pensions vary greatly in both average amount and the number of teachers who collect
them. See Leslie Kan, What is the Average Teacher Pension in My State?, TEACHER PENSIONS
BLOG, https://www.teacherpensions/orgfblog/what-average-teacher-pension-my-state.
85. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., BENEFITS SURVEY (2017), https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/
benefits/2017/ownership/private/table0la.
86. A recent appraisal summarized the problem in these terms:
The bottom line is that half of today's households will not have enough retirement
income to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living, even if they work to age 65
and annuitize all their financial assets, including the receipts from a reverse mortgage
on their homes. This analysis clearly confirms that many of today's workers need to
save more and/or work longer to achieve a secure retirement.
Alicia H. Munnell, Wenliang Hou, & Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher, Nat'l Retirement Risk Index
Shows Modest Improvement in 2016, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLLEGE,
at 7 (2018), available at http://crixbc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/IB-18-1.pdf.
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III. THE PERILS OF EMPLOYER OVERPROMISING
AND WORKER OVERRELIANCE-
THE GROWING ANXIETY
In the struggle between workers and their employers, employer
action eliminating or cutting back on pension promises has also been a
recognized feature of American labor history in the private sector
with industrial corporations. As a result, this has been a serious prob-
lem in the private sector over time.87 The danger of failing pension
systems is not only an American problem since this important issue
appears to be global in nature affecting workers in many countries of
the economically-developed world.88 The American 20th century
public policy response to this problem was to impose national private
sector standards and to create federally-managed insurance fund to
partially cover the risk of failed company plans. In 1974, Congress
responded to these private sector problems by enacting the Employ-
ment Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA), a federal law
which regulated, and to a limited extent, insured the payment of pri-
vate sector pensions.89 By design, ERISA applied only to the private
sector and not to state and local governmental pensions. As a conse-
87. Significant private pension failures had been noted in the early 20th century. A major
two volume study of the private sector pension systems in 1932 eerily anticipated the present
public pension shortfall situation:
There can be no doubt concerning the importance of the subject of this study. In no
other field of industrial relations has management assumed a financial burden at all
comparable with the liabilities of pension systems. Their total, mounting into billions, is
even more formidable than the mere figures indicate, for many corporations not fully
aware of the cumulative character of pension costs are not establishing adequate
reserves against future payments. Not a few have already suffered from this lack of
foresight and have been forced to deliberalize their plans ....
Bryce M. Stewart, Foreword to MURRAY WEBB LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1932). Now it is state and local government employers that are
attempting to "deliberalize" their plans.
88. In 2016, Citibank estimated that the total value of the unfunded or underfunded govern-
ment pensions for 20 OECD nations is $78 trillion which is nearly twice the $44 trillion national
debt of those same countries. Citi Global Perspectives & Solutions, The Coming Pensions Crisis
3 (2016), available at https://www.citivelocity.com/citigps/coming-pensions-crisis/.
89. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq. ERISA
requires plans to provide participants with plan information including important information
about plan features and funding; sets minimum standards for participation, vesting, benefit ac-
crual and funding; provides fiduciary responsibilities for those who manage and control plan
assets; requires plans to establish a grievance and appeals process for participants to get benefits
from their plans; gives participants the right to sue for benefits and breaches of fiduciary duty;
and, if a defined benefit plan is terminated, guarantees payment of certain benefits through a
federally chartered corporation, known as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), https://www.dol.gov/
general/topic/retirement/erisa (last visited July 14, 2018). In 2018, the PBGC guarantees private
pension plans up to a maximum of $65,045 for a single employer plan and $12,870 for multi-
employer plans. See PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, Maximum Monthly Guaranty
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quence, this federal law does not protect any pension of these public
workers and they are left to whatever state law or constitutional pro-
tections that might exist.
Employer-sponsored retirement benefits exist in both the private
and the public sectors. However, employers are not legally required
to offer pensions and pension coverage in the private sector has de-
clined over the last forty-five years.' Public employee pensions have
been more stable. Currently, approximately 70% of American work-
ers have access to retirement income plans offered by their employ-
ers.91 However, overall only 54% of these employees actually decide
to participate in the plans that are offered.92 The result is that only
38% of all American civilian workers actually choose to participate in
their employer's retirement plans with most workers having access to
defined contribution plans.93 Only 33% of private sector employees
participate in these plans, while 73% of state and local government
employees participate in their plans.94 This striking disparity between
private and public sector employee behavior is best explained by the
fact that public employees have more generous defined benefit pen-
sions that are perceived to be good retirement income sources. Cur-
rent changes to public pension systems limiting these benefits or
making them more difficult to obtain stokes worker anxiety and moti-
vates employee groups to challenge the shifts in policy.
Increasing human longevity extending life expectancy and the
need for adequate post-employment income combined with inade-
quate retirement trust funds build-up has led to numerous discourag-
ing predictions of the sufficiency of pension funds to meet their
obligations. Most often the national media highlights the future ex-
haustion of trust fund assets in the two large federal retirement pro-
Tables, https://www.pbgc.gov/wrfbenefits/guaranteed-benefits/maximum-guarantee (last visited
July 02, 2018).
90. Alicia H. Munnell, Rebecca Cannon Fraenkel, & Josh Hurwitz, The Pension Coverage
Problem in the Private Sector, CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH 2 (2012), http://crr.bc.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2012/09/IB_12-16-508.pdf (noting the decline in participation from 50% in
1979 to 42% in 2010).
91. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES -
MARCH 2017, (2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ebs2_07212017.pdf.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at Table A.
94. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ECONOMICS NEWS RELEASE, TABLE 1. RETIRE-
MENT BENEFITS: ACCESS, PARTICIPATION, AND TAKE Up RATES (March, 2017), https://
www.bls.gov/news.release/ebs2.tOl.html.
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grams: Social Security and Medicare.95 Resolution of this national
retirement policy has yet to be resolved. As part of the growing con-
cerns about income inequality, the possibility of inadequate retire-
ment income for large groups of Americans is increasingly a source of
anxiety. Confidence that workers could retire at predetermined ages
and be able to live their post-employment life with dignity and eco-
nomic security has recently been shaken by the fear of having inade-
quate retirement income and suffering higher future medical costs.9 6
Americans across the political divide are unified both in their
anxiety about economic security during their retirement years97 and
their frustration with the lack of political leadership in resolving this
important issue.98 Many factors help to explain why Americans have
this insecurity about retirement income although much of it is attribu-
table to having insufficient savings. However, the statistics reveal two
different groups of American retirees: those with retirement savings
and those without. Recent research by the U.S. GAO has indicated
that 52% of American households aged fifty-five and older have no
retirement savings in a retirement account or an IRA, but rely on So-
cial Security for most of their retirement income.99 The other 48% of
this age group having some retirement savings has, on average,
$109,000 in savings which generating $409 per month at current rates
for a sixty-five year old.'00 More depressing is the fact that 41% of all
American households in this age range have absolutely no retirement
savings and other financial resources.'0' With so little retirement sav-
ings, this 40% of the older American population views Social Security
95. U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES, A SUMMARY OF THE
2017 ANNUAL REPORTS 1 (2017), https://www.ssa.gov/oact/TRSUM/trl7summary.pdf (noting
that depletion of existing trust funds is predicted to occur in 2035 for the Old Age and Survivors
Insurance, 2028 for Disability Insurance, and 2029 for Medicare Hospital Insurance).
96. Suzanne Woolley, Retirement Dread Is Replacing the American Dream, BLOOMBERG-
PERSONAL FINANCE (July 18, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-18/retire
ment-dread-is-replacing-the-american-dream (noting the anxiety caused by limited Social Secur-
ity trust funds, higher future medical costs and general income inequality).
97. A recent public opinion research study found that 76% of respondents were concerned
about economic conditions affecting their ability to have a secure retirement and that 88% per-
ceived that the nation faces a "retirement crisis." Diane Oakley & Kelly Kenneally, Retirement
Security 2017: A Roadmap for Policy Makers, NAT'L INST. ON RET. SEC. 5 (2017), https://
www.nirsonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2017_opinion-nirsjfinal-web.pdf.
98. Id. at 9 Fig. 3; Id. at 10 Fig. 4.
99. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY, GAO-15-419, RETIREMENT SECURITY: MOST HOUSE-
HOLDS APPROACHING RETIREMENT wrTH Low SAVINGS (2015), available at https://www.gao.gov
/assets/680/670153.pdf.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 9. This group has a median net worth of $21,000 with only $1,000 in non-retire-
ment financial resources.
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payments as its main retirement income although in 2018 the average
Social Security retirement payment was $1,412.14 per month or
$16,945 per year.102 As it approaches retirement age, the economic
prospects for this group planning to rely on Social Security engenders
justifiable anxiety. In this anxious environment, those Americans cur-
rently having employer-sponsored retirement pensions view them as a
crucial lifeline protecting their economic futures. Pension reforms
cutting future retirement income just makes matters worse.
A. For State and Local Government Workers, How Bad is the
Problem?
Even more uncertain is the adequacy of the retirement plan funds
to pay out the future benefits. Employers and employees both con-
tribute to a trust fund to pay these benefits, but these funds are not
adequate, by themselves, to pay the promised benefits if trust fund
investment gains do not consistently add to the fund. While it is possi-
ble for governments to pay employee pension costs on a "pay as you
go" system, nearly all states have adopted a "trust fund" method of
making annual contributions into a fund that is invested in assets for
growth. The pension trust fund, usually designed according to actua-
rial standards, is then expected to grow with the reinvestment of trust
fund profits. These growth assumptions have been based upon his-
toric investment returns that are assumed to continue for decades
10 3
enlarging the size of the trust fund to pay future pension.
Unfortunately, due to the underfunding of current employer con-
tributions and, more importantly, the earning of lower than expected
financial returns on trust fund assets, many of these pension trust
funds have not steadily risen in value needed to pay promised bene-
fits.' °4 Although investment returns vary from year to year based on
102. This is the average amount paid to retirees. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
MONTHLY STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT, DECEMBER 2018, at Table 2, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/
quickfacts/stat snapshot/.
103. A study of 649 the largest pension systems in the U.S. found that the average of ex-
pected returns used by these systems was 7.6%. This assumption assumes that state and local
governments can invest money today, obtain an average of 7.6% that would keep compounding
and that it would double in value every 9.5 years. See Rauh, supra note 8, at 1-2. However,
there can be year-to-year variations in the retirement trust fund rates of return. For instance, the
North Carolina Retirement System reported a 13.5% return on its $98.3 billion of assets in 2017.
See Hazel Bradford, North Carolina Retirement Systems Sees 13.5% Return in 2017, PENSION &
INvESTMENTs (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.pionline.com/article/20180206/ONLINE/18020986 9/
north-carolina-retirement-systems-sees-135-return-in-2017.
104. The U.S. Census Bureau reported in June, 2016 that the 100 largest state and local
government employee pension systems had cash and financial assets totaling $3.25 billion in the
2019]
Howard Law Journal
investment choices, managerial skill and market performance, each
pension system makes long term assumptions on expected investment
returns believed to be necessary to meet future obligations. Un-
derperformance in any one year or in a number of years can set the
growth of the fund back below asset levels that were assumed and that
are needed to reach future pension pay-out levels.10 5 When this hap-
pens these funds are said to carry substantial "unfunded liabilities"
meaning that the retirement trust fund has not accumulated sufficient
assets to pay future benefits even assuming that investment growth
actually rebounds to assumed rates.1°6
Once the fund falls below the assumed growth curve, it must be
supplemented with additional contributions to bolster the trust fund,
or it must achieve investment results above, or even well above, the
plan's assumed rate of growth. The trust fund must greatly increase in
value or else it will not be large enough to meet future payments.
Should this negative underperformance pattern continue, the ex-
pected retirement income generated by these trust funds could be in-
sufficient to pay the full, promised benefits to retirees.1"7 When this
looming pension unfunded liability is considered in conjunction with
governmental debt service costs on usual borrowing and other, non-
pension benefits, the results in some states have appeared to be finan-
first quarter of 2016. As large as this appears to be, it represents growth of only .1% over the
prior quarter and was 4% less than the assets held a year earlier. With expected rates of growth
commonly assumed to be from 7% to 8% over 20 to 30 year periods, these low returns could
spell disaster. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CENSUS BUREAU, G16-QSPP1, SUMMARY OF
THE QUARTERLY SURVEY OF PUBLIC PENSIONS FOR 2016: Q1 (2016), available at https://
www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/econ/g16-qspp2.pdf.
105. Fluctuation of investment returns can be highly variable. One recent report analyzing
164 state and local government pension funds indicated that returns for 2017 were 7.8% while
those for 2016 were only 1.5%. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIRE-
MEN r SYSTEMS, 2017 NCPERS Public Retirement Systems Study 20 (2018), https://
www.ncpers.org/files/2017%20NCPERS%20Public%2ORetirement%2OSystems%20
Study%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf.
106. Research has noted that jurisdictions with significant unfunded future pension liabilities
"assume higher portfolio returns...and are more likely to do so through higher inflation assump-
tions rather than higher real returns." Alexsandar Andonov & Joshua Rauh, The Return Expec-
tations ofInstitutional Investors, SSRN (Dec. 28, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractjid=3091976 (criticizing pension fund managers' assumptions about both expected rates
of return from unreliable historical patterns and the use of exaggerated future inflation
expectations).
107. Whether a municipality would honor its pension commitments has surfaced in the small
number of Chapter 9 bankruptcies in Detroit, Michigan, Stockton, San Bernadino, Vallejo, Cali-
fornia, and Jefferson County, Alabama. See James E. Spiotto, How Municipalities in Financial
Distress Should Deal with Unfunded Pension Obligations and Appropriate Funding of Essential
Services, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 515, 520 & 545-48 (2014). Chapter 9 of the federal Bank-
ruptcy code only provides relief for municipalities, not states.
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cially overwhelming."°8 Many of these jurisdictions have attempted to
reckon with this looming disaster by adopting a range of "pension re-
form" tactics.
The seriousness of the pension funding shortfall is best under-
stood by focusing on the structure of most state and local government
pension systems. Traditionally, these plans have adopted the defined
benefit (DB) method of pensions where the employer promises a level
of retirement income based on longevity on the job, average final sal-
ary and an investment percentage. This three-part multiplication de-
fines a lifetime annuity for the retiring worker and obligates the
governmental employer to have sufficient funds available to make all
payments. This format puts the responsibility of future performance in
paying retirement income squarely on the employer. Because it is not
structured as a "pay-as-you-go" payment system, government pension
planning also entails a considerable amount of estimation uncertainty
and risk. All retirement systems employ actuarial estimation to deter-
mine their future pension payment liabilities and the sufficiency of
their retirement trust funds to provide timely payments.
The structure of the defined benefit retirement income system fo-
cuses on a superficially simple calculus, which combines annual em-
ployer and employee contributions to a managed retirement trust
fund. This money is invested in a range of financial and other assets.
Investment income and capital gains made by these assets provide the
long-term expansion that will enhance the trust fund's size and will
allow for payment of future pensions. Long, sustained investment
earnings for retirement trust funds are crucial to the viability of this
system. A recent study put the relative effect of employer and em-
ployee trust fund contributions as well as trust fund investment re-
turns into stark perspective. The report analyzed public pension
sources of revenue from 1986 through 2015 and concluded that these
trust funds totaled $6.3 trillion in 2015 with a) 12% coming from em-
ployee contributions, b) 25% given by employers, and c) 63% gener-
ated by investment earnings. The striking conclusion of this study was
that investment performance was twice as important to pension trust
fund growth as employer and employee contributions combined.
108. Alicia H. Munnell & Jean-Pierre Aubry, WILL PENSIONS AND OPEBS BREAK STATE
AND LOCAL BUDGETS?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES., 4-5 figs. 5, 6, & 7 (2016), available at
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/slp_51_rev.pdf (illustrating the wide variation of re-
quired payments for pensions, OPEBs and debt service as a percentage of state revenue in
FY2014).
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With nearly two-thirds of the trust fund's future size being derived
from their investment yield, managers must be consistently successful
over decades and must reinvest gains for the high compounded results
needed to pay pensions. Any underperformance from predicted
levels of return would result in inadequate funds to fully pay all pen-
sion claims when due.
The recent pension reform legal and policy changes have been
adopted in the face of some alarming financial predictions. In 2017,
state and local government retirement systems controlled $3.96 trillion
in financial assets in trust funds for worker's pensions.10 9 However,
the Federal Reserve calculated that nationwide these pension entitle-
ments were underfunded by 32% in 2017.110 Although pension liabili-
ties differ from state to state, the highest unfunded liabilities exist in
New Jersey, Illinois, Alaska, Kentucky and Connecticut.1 ' Some ana-
lysts fear that existing retirement trust funds in a number of states
may be so seriously underfunded that they may not be able to provide
the promised benefits.1 1 2 If that were to occur either retirement bene-
fits would have to be cut or future budgets would have to pay retirees
the missing portion. Although the health of state retirement plans is
unevenly distributed, the overall shortfall is truly astounding in de-
gree-reaching trillions of dollars."3 In some states, these shortfalls are
so large that the financial health of the entire state and local govern-
109. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: FIRST QUARTER 99 tbl. L. 120 (2017).
110. Id. A study by the Society of Actuaries analyzed 130 state and large city public pension
plans covering 27 million workers and retirees and concluded that the unfunded liability in this
sample was 27% in 2014. Lisa Schilling & Patrick Wiese, U.S. PUBLIC PENSION PLAN CONTRIBU-
TION INDICES, 2006-2014, SocIETY OF ACTUARIES (2017).
111. In New Jersey and Illinois, the unfunded liability reached $12,656 and $12,413 respec-
tively for each and every person living in those states. On the other end of the spectrum, re-
sidents of North Carolina and Oregon had per capita unfunded liabilities of $73 and $43 in the
same year. Wisconsin and South Dakota actually had retirement trust fund surpluses. See Chris
Edwards, FISCAL POLICY REPORT CARD ON AMERICA'S GOvERNORS 2016 10-11 tbl. 2, CATO
INST. (2016).
112. Collectively, state and local government pension obligations represent a huge future
liability. Some recent estimates have estimated the future unfunded liability of state and local
government pensions to be $4 trillion and some believe that pension liabilities have been greatly
underestimated. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, Public Pension Promises: How Big Are
They and What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1 (2010) (Viewing these pension promises as de-
ferred compensation and as debt, this number dwarfs all existing state and local bond liability by
a 4 to 1 ratio).
113. See Elizabeth Campbell, Reckoning Comes for U.S. Pension Funds as Investment Re-
turns Lag, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-21/
reckoning-comes-for-u-s-pension-funds-as-investment-returns-lag (unfunded liability of state
and local government pension systems estimated at $1.9 trillion and predicted to grow with con-
tinued low interest rates).
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ments has also been called into question,14with predictions of cata-
strophic economic and social effects without changes in current
policies.115 With pension expenses growing so quickly legislators see
pension expenses as crowding out other state and local budget priori-
ties and devouring huge percentages of public revenues.
The second uncertain aspect of pension plan design is the amount
and duration of the retirement pension payments. The expansion of
the trust fund caused by investment income is simultaneously reduced
by the financial benefits paid out to retiring employees and by the
expenses incurred in managing the fund. As simple as this system may
appear, these defined benefit retirement plans promise specific finan-
cial benefits whose size is difficult to estimate. There is a great deal of
uncertainty in these important financial plans. How long will employ-
ees work? What will be their final compensation level? How long will
retirees live? All of these factors combine to make meeting the gov-
ernment's future pension obligations a daunting estimation problem.
Finally, as the public workforce ages and reaches retirement age,
the adequacy of state and local governmental retirement systems will
be challenged as the financial demands of paying benefits mount.
Complexity is added to this system by the long time period separating
the contributions to the fund from the withdrawals in the payment of
benefits. Retirement funds pay core benefits in the form of a pension
payments payable as a monthly annuity and often this income support
is increased through post-retirement benefit adjustments called cost of
living increases. The entire retirement system is predicated on the
idea that an adequately-funded trust fund will grow to pay these bene-
fits. With the financial collapse in 2008-2009 shrinking trust funds, the
sustainability of the current system was certainly in doubt.
114. The State of Illinois presents the most vivid current conflict between a state's governor
and legislature with its employee unions and its Supreme Court. See Bruce J. McNeil & Jack E.
Karns, Illinois Supreme Court Deal Says to the Government: The Price is Right for the Pension
Prize, J. PENSION PLANNING & Comp. 35-65 (2015). Illinois is not alone with an array of state
legislatures have embarked upon highly divisive reform strategies. See e.g., Brian Eason, Colo.
Lawmakers Face Their Most Costly Issue in Years, THE DENVER POST at Al, March 13, 2018;
Tom Loftus, Bevin Posts Message to Make Case for Pension Bill, TiE COURIER-JOURNAL (Mar.
18, 2018), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/2018/03/18/kentucky-gov-matt-
bevin-social-media-pension-bill/436152002/
115. George F. Will, America's Utterly Predictable Tsunami of Pension Problems, WASH.
POST (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/americas-utterly-predictable-
tsunami-of-pension-problems/2017/02/22/e5deOOe-f869-1 le6-9845-576c69081518_story.html?
utm_term=.1695e8a93b6d (claiming that each American household is responsible for $19,000
government pension debt).
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IV. RECENT STATE POLICY RESPONSES TO FEARS OF
PENSION TRUST FUND INADEQUACY
States and local governments have begun to recognize the serious
deficiencies in their retirement systems and the funds dedicated to pay
future benefits. They have started to take action. Over the last sev-
eral years a large number of states and localities have begun to ad-
dress these difficult questions through the adoption of a range of
measures subsumed under the general heading of "pension re-
form." '116 Reflecting the universality of this social and economic prob-
lem, similar reform measures have been recently proposed in other
nations as well." 7 These changes are widespread throughout the na-
tion with a recent study of nearly 260 state and local government pen-
sion plans finding that from 2009 through 2014, 74% of state plans and
57% of large local plans reduced retirement benefits and/or raised
employee contributions.118 Most frequently, new employees have
been affected most by these program changes, although in some
places current workers also have had their retirement plans changed.
Many different pension reform policies have been adopted across
the United States. These retirement benefit changes run the gamut
from making technical retirement calculation adjustments to the im-
position of whole-scale revisions to existing retirement systems. The
most common reforms have fallen into the following patterns:
1. Requiring current employees to make higher rates of employee
pension contributions and applying higher rates to new hires. Public
employees contribute a portion of their salaries to the state's retire-
116. See Jeffrey R. Brown, Reforming Public Pensions Subject to Political and Legal Con-
straints: The Illinois Experience, 67 NAT. TAX REV. 941--64 (2014); Maria 0. Hylton, The Case
for Public Pension Reform: Early Evidence from Kentucky, 47 CREIGrroN L. REv. 585--609
(2014); Andre S. Digou, A View of the Rhode Island Pension Landscape: The Potential Reform
of Local Pension Plans Under the Preemption Doctrine, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 740-66
(2014). See also TIE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, RoADS TO REFORM: CHANGES TO PUBLIC SEC-
TOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS ACROSS STATES 1 (2010), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-
and-analysis/reports/2010/11/11/roads-to-reform-changes-to-public-sector-retirement-benefits-
across-states.
117. See, e.g., Lans Bovenberg & Raymond Gradus, Reforming occupational pension
schemes: the case of the Netherlands, 18 J. ECON. POL. REFORM 244-257 (2015); Richard Disney,
Pension Reform in the United Kingdom: An Economic Perspective, 237 NAT'L. INST. ECON. REV.
R6-R12 (2016).
118. Jean-Pierre Aubry & Caroline V. Crawford, STATE AND LOCAL PENSION REFORM
SINCE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. 3 (2016). The major plan changes
were increased employee contributions to pension plans, reduced cost of living adjustments in
received pensions, calculations for the final average salary, reduction in the benefit factor used
to calculate pension benefits, increasing the retirement age or pension vesting time, and the shift
to a defined contribution or hybrid system of pensions.
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ment fund and this contribution is matched by a contribution made by
the state or local government employer. Pension reforms have shifted
more of the costs of funding the governmental defined benefit retire-
ment plans on to the employees with legislation mandating increased
deductions from employee salaries in differing amount.19 In some
instances, these higher retirement benefit costs were imposed solely
on new hires and not on current workers; but in some jurisdictions,
they were charged to both categories of workers. Some jurisdictions
totally abandoned defined benefit retirement plans for newly hired
workers, replacing them with 401k-like defined contribution
systems.
120
2. Requiring increased age and service requirements before pen-
sion eligibility for new hires and existing workers. Government pen-
sions require workers to satisfy minimum age and length of service
requirements before they can be eligible for receiving retirement ben-
efits. Recent changes have extended those minimum requirements for
current workers making the terms required for earning the pensions
more onerous and longer to achieve. New hires have also been sub-
ject to lengthier "vesting" requirement establishing the minimum
working time needed for being determined eligible for even a small
pension.
3. Reducing pension benefits by reducing the defined benefit pen-
sion multiplier "factor." Defined benefit pensions are usually deter-
mined by multiplying three elements together: the number of years of
work, the average final salary, and the pension multiplier factor. The
pension multiplier is a percentage that is multiplied by the number of
years of service resulting in a percentage of the final average salary
that will be received as the pension. This final element is described
with many different terms, but it has the potential to greatly affect the
119. See generally PENSION LITIGATION TRACKER, http://pensionlitigation.org/category/all/
topics/increased-employee-contribution/ (Last visited Jan. 27, 2019); Christina McFarland, Mak-
ing Informed Choices About Public Sector Pension Plans, NAT'L LEAGUE OF CITIES, https://
www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/MakingInformedChangestoPublicSectorPensionPlans.
pdf. On the federal level, the proposed FY2019 budget proposal includes a new requirement
that federal employees contribute 6% of their salary to their federal pensions; Eric Yoder,
Budget Provides No Raise, Targets Retirement Benefits for Employees, WASH. POST (Feb. 12,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2018/02/12/budget-provides-no-
raise-targets-retirement-benefits-for-federal-employees/?utm-term=.6b3139ba953.
120. See Tom Loftus, Kentucky pension crisis: Are 401(k) Plans the Solution, THE COURIER-
JOURNAL (Sept. 15, 2017, 6:17PM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/2017/09/
15/kentucky-pension-crisis-401-k-plans-solution/626423001/.
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size of the defined benefit pension received by the employee.121 As
the percentage rises, the final pension payment increases and when it
falls the final pension decreases. Different categories of employees
may be awarded different multiplier factors as a reflection of their job
characteristics or their political power.
4. Increasing the number of years to determine the employees
"average final salary." Since most defined benefit pensions are deter-
mined by multiplying the number of years of credited employment by
the average final salary, determining this second factor can affect the
resulting pension payments. Many states had previously adopted a
three year "average final salary" metric which computed an average
over a continuous thirty-six month period with the highest compensa-
tion.122 To lower future pension benefits, some states have increased
the averaging period for the "average final salary" to five years which
has had the effect of lowering the average final salary by adding lower
salary years to the expanded average.123 By reducing this factor in the
three part calculus, the final annual pension would be made lower.
5. Disallowing employees from using accrued sick leave, vacation
leave or overtime pay to augment their number of years of work or
final average income. Some pension systems have allowed employees
to receive pension credit for unused leave and final year's overtime
pay to increase their income and extend their work time in the final
years of employment. This has been called pension "spiking" and has
been widely targeted as one form of pension abuse where workers
121. See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA BOARD OF PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT, SUMMARY PLAN
DESCRIPTION (2015) https://www.phila.gov/pensions/PDF/Summary%20Plan%2010.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 29, 2019); TEACHER'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM KENTUCKY, https://trs.ky.gov/active-mem
bers/membership/plan/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
122. Pennsylvania's retirement system employs a 3-year averaging period. See EMPLOYEES
RETIREMENT SYSTEM, MEMBER HANDBOOK: RETIREMENT BENEFIT CALCULATION STATE 11
http://sers.pa.gov/pdf/SERSMemberHandbook.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2019). Some states
like New York have multiple final average salary averaging periods for different "tiers" of em-
ployees. See NYSLRS Basics: Final Average Salary, NEw YORK RETIREMENT NEWS (Sept. 27,
2017), http://nyretirementnews.comnyslrs-basics-understanding-final-average-salary/. Contrary
to popular belief, Congressmen and Senators draw their pensions with this same 3-year average
and they must have at least 5 years of service to draw any pension. See Katelin P. Isaacs, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, CRL REPORT RL 30631
(Dec. 5, 2017).
123. The FY2019 proposed federal budget changes the average final salary calculation from 3
years to 5 years and the elimination of Cost of Living Adjustments. Ian Smith, Substantial Cuts
to Federal Employee Benefits Proposed in FY 2019 Budget, FEDSMrTH (Feb. 12 2018), https://
www.fedsmith.com/2018/02/12/substantial-cuts-federal-employee-benefits-proposed-fy-2019
budget/.
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have been able to substantially raise their final average income above
their actual earnings.124 This has been disallowed or limited.
6. Reducing or eliminating pension cost of living (COLA) adjust-
ments.125 Government pension benefits often are supplemented by
cost of living adjustments that annually raise pension cash payments
to keep them in line with inflation. The cost of living adjustment, often
tracking the CPI, raises retiree pension payments each year and
thereby increases the long-term costs to the pension system.
1 26
The stakes in this public policy conflict could not be higher having
serious consequences for government employees and for taxpayers.
How will governmental employers deal with their long-term employ-
ees who have served them well and who have relied on earlier
promises regarding their retirement pensions and other benefits.1 2 7 A
reciprocal problem exists for state legislators and policy makers since
finding financial resources to honor these promises made by their
predecessors may pose serious questions since meeting existing pen-
sion promises may impose higher present and future costs diverting
124. See, e.g., Natanya Friedheim, Pension Spiking Costs Taxpayers Millions - Now The
Push Is On To Stop It, HONOLULU CIVIL BEAT (Sept. 15, 2017), http://www.civilbeat.org/2017/
09/pension-spiking-costs-taxpayers-millions-now-the-push-is-on-to-stop-it/; Mary Jo Webster,
Public Pension 'Spiking': Overtime Hours Soar for St. Paul Fire Supervisors, TwIN CITIES (Dec.
8, 2012), https://www.twincities.com/2012/12/08/public-pension-spiking-overtime-hours-soar-for-
st-paul-fire-supervisors/; NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF STATE TREASURER, NORTH CAROLINA
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS ANTI-PENSION SPIKING CONTRIBUTION-BASED BENEFIT CAP (2014),
https://www.nctreasurer.com/ret/Board %20of%2OTrustees/AntiPensionSpikingContribution
BasedBenefitCap.pdf#search=pension%20spiking; Catherine Saillant, Maloy Moore & Doug
Smith, Salary 'spiking' Drains Public Pension Funds, Analysis Finds, LA TIMES (Mar. 3, 2014),
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/O3/local/la-me-county-pensions-20120303; Mike Baker, State
Feels Bite of Workers' Pension Spiking, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 6, 2013), https://
www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/state-feels-bite-of-workers-pension-spiking/.
125. In Kentucky, public school teachers threatened to strike if the Kentucky legislature re-
duced the retiree cost of living adjustment from 1.5% to 1% annually. See Tom Loftus, State
Pension Fight Nears End; Fate of Big School Cuts Also Hangs in Balance, THE COURIER-JOUR-
NAL 2 (Mar. 27, 2018).
126. See California's cost of living adjustment policy found at California Public Employees
Retirement System. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Cost-of-Living Ad-
justment (COLA), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/retirees/cost-of-living/cola. Some states have
pension reform proposals that cap future COLA payments and tie their availability to the over-
all funding level of the state's pension system. See Michael Katz, Louisiana Proposes Pension
Reform Bill, CHIEF INVESTMENT OFFICER (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.ai-cio.com/news/louisiana-
proposes-pension-reform-bill (pension system would have to be 65% funded for COLAs to be
granted).
127. This article will focus its discussion on retirement income provided by pensions. State
and local governments have made similar post-employment promises with regard to retiree
health insurance and other benefits. Analysis suggests that rapid health care cost escalation may
also make these retirement benefits underfunded and the next target for cost-cutting govern-
mental employers. See Marc E. Fitch, Connecticut Has $36 Billion in Unfunded OPED Liabili-
ties, YANKEE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y (Mar. 29, 2018), http://www.yankeeinstitute.org/2018/03/
connecticut-has-36-billion-in-unfunded-opeb-liabilities/.
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scarce financial resources from other much-needed public expendi-
tures. Without supporting tax increases, how will basic governmental
services be provided if employee pension costs greatly increase?
With assessments of pension funds indicating that existing plans
would not be sufficient to meet their obligations, each state has been
confronted with a series of policy and legal choices. How would this
ever-expanding future financial obligation be met? Would future em-
ployee retirement income and other benefits be reduced? Would em-
ployees and/or employers be required to contribute more into the
pension trust fund? Would the defined benefit plan design be aban-
doned to limit future governmental pension exposure? These impor-
tant, and highly controversial, questions have surfaced in many state-
level political conflicts and they have been examined in academic pol-
icy analyses.128 Unfortunately, there appears to be no "perfect" an-
swer about how to proceed. Finding ways to meet existing pension
obligations will undoubtedly impose serious financial demands on
state and local government budgets crowding out other important
government programs.1 29 This occurs at a time when virtually no po-
litical will exists to increase state or local taxes.3 ° In this political
environm ent, policymakers have been left with one alternative - cut-
ting back on current employee costs and making public retirement
benefits less generous.
Finding a way to reduce pension costs has been a primary con-
cern of state and local governments. With this cost-saving goal, these
new policies also have been associated with providing reduced bene-
fits to public workers or making it more difficult for them to qual-
ify.' 3' The overall goal of these varied changes has been to lower
128. Juan Perez Jr., CPS Slates 4 Furlough Days to Aid Budget Gap: District Says Move Will
Save $35M, Won't Cut Class Time, CHI. TRIB., at Cl (Jan. 14, 2017) (Governor's veto of bill
granting $215 million to teacher pension fund since it did not broadly reform the pension
system).
129. Id.; supra note 45, at x-xi.
130. In its 2017 ranking of the states by fiscal condition, the Mercatus Center at George
Mason University evaluated the fiscal solvency of the states and determined that unfunded pen-
sion liabilities drive the states into "fiscal peril." See Eileen Norcross & Olivia Gonzalez, Rank-
ing States by Fiscal Condition 2017 Edition, MERCATUS CENTER: GEORGE MASON UNIV. (July
11, 2017), https://www.mercatus.org/statefiscalrankings20l7. See also Elise Young, Hoboken
Crash Tests a Railroad Beset by N.J. Fiscal Crisis, BLOOMBERO (Sept. 29, 2016, 1:48 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-29/beleaguered-n-j-transit-gets-another-round-of-
rail-hardship https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-29/beleaguered-n-j-transit-gets-
another-round-of-rail-hardship.
131. Michael Corkery, Pension Crisis Looms Despite Cuts, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2012, 8:02
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SBI0000872396390443890304578010752828935688 (stating
that 45 states had reduced public pension benefits).
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present and future benefit costs to government employers making
these future obligations sufficiently funded and more likely to be
honored.3 ' Pension reform policies affect three categories of work-
ers: (1) currently retired former employees; (2) members of the ex-
isting workforce; and (3) prospective workers who will be hired in the
future. The strongest claim to pension stability rests with currently
retired persons since they have begun to receive their earned benefits.
The weakest claim to prior pension rights appears to be with new
workers who have accepted a less generous package of benefits as
they entered employment. The second category - existing workers -
presents the most difficult group to assess since their benefits have
been reduced after being previously more generous. Not surprisingly,
these new state policies have been extremely unpopular with existing
public employees, often resulting in legal challenges most often in
state court.133 As a result, state and local employees have been
presented with pension policy changes that work to reduce expected
and retirement benefits or to increase employee costs for expected
retirement income.134 Not surprisingly, widespread court challenges
have been made. The outcome of this litigation has varied and these
case decisions are the main subject of the next section of this article.
132. A secondary benefit of implementing pension reform has been to improve the credit
worthiness of the state or city as reflected in maintaining or raising the quality of their govern-
mental debt and lowering their borrowing costs. See Amanda Albright, Memphis No Longer
Sings Pension Blues Ahead of Biggest Bond Sale, BLOOMBERG LAW: BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION NEWS (Apr. 17, 2018) (describing the Memphis, Tennessee xperience). But see
James Comtois, Connecticut's High Unfunded Pension Liabilities Leads to Credit Downgrade,
PENSIONS & INV. (Apr. 17, 2018, 2:42 PM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20180417/ONLINE/
18041984/connecticuts-high-unfunded-pension-liabilities-leads-to-credit-downgrade (describing
Connecticut's bond rating downgrade).
133. There are also many cases challenging restrictive interpretations of state or local gov-
ernment retirement law. In these cases, courts are asked to interpret the meaning of state or
local government retirement statutes in a conventional manner. See, e.g., Office of Admin. &
Pa. State Police v. State Emp. Ret. Bd., 180 A.3d 740 (Pa. 2018) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court
upholding ruling that union service pay was retirement pension compensation) and McGlynn v.
State, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 470, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (upholding trial court holding that state
retirement statute applied to judges elected under prior law).
134. Similar warning alarms have recently sounded with regard to retiree health care benefits
which nearly 77% of all local governments pay for their retirees and whose unfunded liability
has recently been estimated at $1 trillion or about 1/3 of all state and local government annual
revenue. See Byron Lutz & Louise Sheiner, The Fiscal Stress Arising from State and Local
Health Obligations, 38 J. HEALTH ECON. 130, 130-46 (Dec. 2014) (constituting 
1h of the unfunded
liability of retirement pensions).
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V. SEEKING JUDICIAL PROTECTION FOR PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE PENSION "RIGHTS"
A. What State Pension Reforms Triggered Litigation by
Employees and Retirees?
Pension reforms have taken a range of forms as state and local
governments have attempted to shore up the financial foundations for
their employee retirement benefits by redesigning the benefits offered
to new workers and by modifying features of existing programs. With
these changes being considered adverse to collective employee and
retiree financial interests, it is not surprising that litigation has ensued.
The resort to court review of pension reform policies also represents a
response to the changing political fortunes of public employees. As
such, these lawsuits represent political statements of protest as much
as attempts to use legal principles to invalidate or limit the benefit
changes that have been enacted. This litigation history is important to
understand for both its symbolic significance as well as its practical
importance.
Disappointed and dissatisfied with changes made to their benefits
by current political leaders, workers and their representatives have
elected to litigate their claims in an effort to vindicate their "rights"
which the current political system has refused to respect. They have
also accused state pension officials of mismanagement and poor judg-
ment.135 As the discussion below will reveal, much of the recent litiga-
tion challenging the pension benefit changes have been unsuccessful
for employees and retirees.136 These unsuccessful cases often reflect
workers' misperceptions about the true nature of their employment
"rights" - many times believing that they are permanent and un-
changeable. This belief has turned out to be a mistake as the courts
135. Tom Loftus, Lawsuit: Retirement Systems Gambled on Hedge Funds, Concealed its Fi-
nancial Mess, LOtISVILLE COURIER J. (Dec. 27, 2017, 2:25 PM), https://www.courier-jour-
nal.com/story/news/politics/2017/12/27/lawsuit-kentucky-retirement-systems-gambled-hedge-
funds/982740001/ (accusing retirement officials, consultants, hedge funds of entering a "civil con-
spiracy" on poor investment choices that were concealed from employees.); Michael Katz,
Hedge Fund Tells Kentucky Pension to Take a Hike, Chief Investment Officer (July 5, 2018),
https://www.ai-cio.com/newshedge-fund-tefls-kentucky-pension-take-hike/ (hedge fund refused
to comply with CFA Institute's codes of ethics and professional conduct that was part of a Ken-
tucky pension transparency bill).
136. The article concentrates on litigation brought to challenge systematic changes in state
and local government retirement benefit plans. Other cases not the main focus of this article
consider individual claims based on complaints based on the administration of existing pension
systems. See, e.g., Kendall v. Gov't V.I., 596 F. App'x 150 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming district court
judgment against retired judge's challenge to pension calculation).
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have been unwilling to strike down many of these recent reform mea-
sures adopted in the face of the looming financial crisis facing the gov-
ernmental employers. The cases ultimately illustrate the futility of
using courts to rectify these kinds of political decisions.
This review of selected state and federal itigation from 2008-2018
has been comprised of a total of 100 reported case decisions from 35
states reflecting a wide national distribution.'37 Twenty-seven of these
decisions were from the federal district courts, courts of appeals, and
bankruptcy courts while 72 of them were rendered in state supreme
courts, courts of appeals, and trial courts. Each year saw some deci-
sions although the peak frequency in decisions was in 2014 through
2016.138 This distribution probably reflects the lag time between the
adoption of the pension reform, litigation, and the issuance of a re-
ported decision.
The analysis of these decisions revealed patterns in the nature of
the retirement policy changes that led employee and retiree groups to
seek judicial review and their potential invalidation.139  Obviously,
this litigation was triggered by the executive and legislative branches
of government adopting the challenged pension reforms. The chal-
lengers were seeking to have the popularly-supported reform mea-
sures invalidated as being contrary to specific statutory standards or
particular constitutional principles. Viewed in this light, the court
137. In selecting the cases for review there was a conscious effort to avoid merely procedural
decisions related to pension reform challenges. See, e.g., Wood v. Unified Gov't Athens-Clarke
Cty., 818 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2016) (reversing district court on statute of limitations issue to
retiree benefits change).
138. The pension reform litigation analyzed in this review had the following distribution:
Total number of cases reviewed: 100.
Total number of states involved: 35.
Level of courts:
State Supreme Court: 36 cases.
State Appellate Court: 33 cases.
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals: 17 cases.
U.S. District Court: 10 cases.
U.S. Bankruptcy Court: 1 case.
FREQUENCY OF DECISIONS-YEAR BY YEAR:
2019]
139. The group of cases chosen for review in this analysis is a representative sample of re-
ported litigation of pension reform policies in the eight-year period from 2010 through early
2018 does not constitute an exhaustive survey but rather it seeks to provide a general description
of the most common forms of pension reform challenges.
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challenges attempted to use legal concepts to block democratically-
adopted policy choices that disadvantaged workers and retirees. Ex-
amples of the most common policies triggering litigation challenges
were:
i. The State Amended Existing Retirement Plans by Either Cut-
ting Retirement Benefits or Reducing the State Contributions.'40
ii. The State Modified the Retirement Benefit Calculation
Formula.1
4 1
iii. The State Required Employees to Increase Their Contribu-
tions to the Pension Plan for Retirement Benefits.'
42
iv. The State Decreased the Cost of Living Adjustment
(COLA) to Retirement Pension Benefits.
143
140. See, e.g., Cherry v. Mayor & City Council of Bait., No. MJG-10-1447, 2011 WL
11027560 (D. Md. Sept. 6, 2011); Metcalfe v. State, 382 P.3d 1168 (Alaska 2016); San Joaquin
Cty. Corr. Officers Ass'n v. Cty. of San Joaquin, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016); S.D.
Police Officers Ass'n v. S.D. City Emps.' Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009); Awdziewicz v.
City of Meriden, 115 A.3d 1084 (Conn. 2015); Jones v. Mun. Emps.' Annuity & Benefit Fund, 50
N.E.3d 596 (Ill. 2016); Heaton v. Quinn, 32 N.E.3d 1 (Ill. 2015); Welch v. Brown, 935 F. Supp. 2d
875 (E.D. Mich. 2013); Coal. of State Emp. Unions v. State, 870 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. 2015); Moro
v. State, 351 P.3d 1 (Or. 2015); Dodd v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.3d 180 (6th Cir. 2017);
Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, 833 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2016); Alameda Cty.
Sheriff's Ass'n v. Alameda Cty. Emps. Ret. Ass'n., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
141. See, e.g., Fields v. Elected Officials' Ret. Plan, 320 P.3d 1160 (Ariz. 2014); Hall v.
Elected Officials' Ret. Plan, 383 P.3d 1107 (Ariz. 2016); S.D. City Firefighters v. Bd. of Admin.,
141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Cty. of Orange v. Ass'n of Orange Cty. Deputy
Sheriffs, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 151 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Deputy Sheriffs' Association of S.D. v. Cty.
of S.D., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015); Stoker v. Milwaukee Cty., 857 N.W.2d 102
(Wis. 2014); Marin Ass'n of Pub. Emps.' v. Marin Cty. Emps.' Ret. Ass'n, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365
(Cal. Ct. App. 2016); City of Hollywood v. Bien, 209 So. 3d 1(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016); Puckett,
833 F.3d 590; Cloutier v. State, 42 A.3d 816 (N.H. 2012); Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. State, 111
A.3d 63 (N.H. 2015); Local 101 of Am. Fed'n & Mun. Emps. v. Brown, No. 14-cv-05640-BLF,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130988 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2017); Valde v. Emp. Appeal Bd., No. 17-
0266, 2017 Iowa App. LEXIS 953 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2017); Cranston Firefighters, IAFF
Local 1363, AFL-CIO v. Raimondo, No. 16-130-ML, 2017 WL 899948 (D.R.I. Mar. 7, 2017);
Cranston Firefighters, IAFF Local, 1363 AFL-CIO v. Raimondo, 880 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2018).
142. See, e.g., Taylor v. City of Gadsden, 767 F.3d 1124 (11th Cir. 2014); Borders v. City of
Atlanta, 779 S.E.2d 279 (Ga. 2015); Prof'l Fire Fighters of N.H. v. State, 107 A.3d 1229 (N.H.
2014); Teamsters Local 97 v. State, 84 A.3d 989 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014); Andrews v.
Lombardi, No. KC-13-1129, 2017 R.I. Super. LEXIS 31 (R.I. Super. Feb. 2, 2017); Bishop v. City
of Columbia, 738 S.E.2d 255 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013).
143. See, e.g., Protect Our Benefits v. City & Cty. of S.F., 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d 410 (Cal. Ct. App.
2015); Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202 (Colo. 2014); Me. Ass'n of Retirees v. Bd. of Trs., 758 F.3d 23
(1st Cir. 2014); Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143 (NJ. 2016); Bartlett v. Cameron, 316 P.3d 889
(N.M. 2013); Frazier v. City of Chattanooga., 151 F. Supp. 3d 830 (E.D. Tenn. 2015); Frazier v.
City of Chattanooga, 841 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2016); Van Houten v. City of Fort Worth, 827 F.3d
530 (5th Cir. 2016); Wash. Educ. Ass'n v. Wash. Dept. of Ret. Sys., 332 P.3d 439 (Wash. 2014);
Cherry, 762 F.3d 366.
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v. The State Denied Employees the Right to Purchase Credited
Service to Enhance Pension Benefits.1 "
vi. The State Changed/Reduced/ Refused to Increase Health
Benefits.
145
vii. The State Increased Premiums for Retiree Health Care
Benefits or the State Removed Health Care Benefits from Pension
Plans.46
B. How Does the Law Characterize Employee Retirement
Benefits?
Citizens often believe that they have "rights" in many things-
free speech, voting, and fair treatment under the law. They consider
these rights in the abstract assuming that they have some form of legal
protection grounded in a general conception of "the law." Most pub-
lic employees consider their compensation and other employee bene-
fits to be earned and once earned to be their property or at least
something that they "own." Workers look to their representatives and
to their employers to explain these complicated future rights and
often they have been given concrete verbal or written predictions of
their retirement benefits. Consequently, when state and local officials
act to change the expected terms of these pension "rights," many of
these workers feel that their trust has been betrayed and they must act
to take legal action challenging the change.
When these challenges move from the arena of public opinion
and employee belief to the state and federal courts, the legal charac-
144. See, e.g., Pendergast v. Ariz. State Ret. Sys., 323 P.3d 1186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014); Cal
Fire Local 2881 v. Cal. Publ. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
145. See, e.g., Sacramento Cty. Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Cty. of Sacramento, No. CIV
S-11-0355 KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 1082807 (E.D. Cal. March 31, 2012); Fry v. City of L.A., 199
Cal. Rptr. 3d 694 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016); Requa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 440
(Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Dannenberg v. State, 383 P.3d 1177 (Haw. 2016); Underwood v. City of
Chi., 779 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2015); Kanerva v. Weems, 13 N.E.3d 1228 (III. 2014); Matthews v.
Chi. Transit Auth., 51 N.E.3d 753 (Ill. 2016); AFT Mich. v. State, 866 N.W.2d 782 (Mich. 2015);
Retired Pub. Emps. Ass'n v. Cuomo, 123 A.D.3d 92 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014); R.I. Council 94 v.
R.I., 705 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.R.I. 2010); Vallejo Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Vallejo, 223 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017); Weaver v. Town of N. Castle, 153 A.D.3d 531 (N.Y. App. Div.
2017); Wood v. Unified Gov't Athens-Clarke Cty., No. 3:14-CV-43, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9476
(M.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2018).
146. See, e.g., Hussey v. Milwaukee Cty., 740 F.3d 1139 (7th Cir. 2014); Retired Emps. Ass'n
of Orange Cty., Inc. v. Cty. of Orange, 266 P.3d 287 (Cal. 2011); Christiansen v. Cty. of Douglas,
849 N.W.2d 493 (Neb. 2014); State Emps.' Ass'n of N.H. v. State, 20 A.3d 961 (N.H. 2011);
Gamel v. Cincinnati, 983 N.E.2d 375 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012); N.Y. State Corr. Officers & Police
Benevolent Ass'n v. N.Y., 911 F. Supp. 2d 111 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); Roberts v. N.Y., 911 F. Supp.2d
149 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).
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terization of employee retirement benefits becomes a central focus
strongly affecting the resolution of the legal challenge. What exactly
does the employee own and what rights are actually associated with
these retirement benefits? In the absence of federal preemption, the
states have been free to fashion their own law and policy to answer
these questions. Often a state's formal legal characterization of em-
ployee pensions provides a structured analysis that can determine the
ultimate lawfulness of pension reform measures.14 7 While fitting into
a group of patterns, each state has fashioned its own jurisprudence on
this subject, often blending both federal and state law. 148 It is also
common for litigants to plead multiple legal theories simultaneously
seeking the invalidation of some pension benefit policy change.49
Legal analysis has broken the states down into 5 theoretical
categories:
15°
1. Pensions are the employer's gratuity or gift to the employee
when made.
2. Pension rights are governed by promissory estoppel principles
focusing on justifiable reliance.
3. Pension benefits are property rights when earned and are pro-
tected under Due Process and Takings principles.
4. Pensions are employee contract rights when earned and pro-
tected by general contract law principles as well as constitutional "im-
pairment of contract" prohibitions.
5. Pensions are employee contract rights when earned and have
additional protection under specialized state constitutional provisions.
147. Some cases are judicial review of administrative decisions about operation of a retire-
ment plan. See, e.g., Pub. Emp. Ret. Admin. Comm'n v. Contrib. Ret. Appeal Bd., 90 N.E.3d 744
(Mass. 2018) (upholding decision that sick pay and vacation pay are not regular compensation)
and Worcester Reg'l Ret. Bd. v. Contrib. Ret. Appeal Bd., 88 N.E.3d 1169 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017)
(upholding decision to allow purchase of additional work credit).
148. See generally, Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5
EDUC. FIN. & POL'Y (2010); JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41736, STATE AND
LOCAL PENSION PLANS & FISCAL DISTRESS: A LEGAL OVERVrEW (2011).
149. Cranston Firefighters, IAFF Local 1363, AFL-CIO v. Raimondo, No. 16-130-ML, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32327, at *25 (D.R.I. Mar. 7, 2017) (Contracts clause, Takings clause and Due
Process clause theories in complaint); Teamsters Local 97 v. State, 84 A.3d 989 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2014) (arguing Contract, Due Process, and Takings Clauses).
150. See Alicia H. Munnell & Laura Quinby, Legal Constraints on Changes in State and
Local Pensions, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT B.C.: STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS 2 (No.
25, Aug. 2012) and William T. Payne, Joel R. Hunt & Ruairi McDonnell, The Constitutional
Limitations on Public Employee Pension Reform Legislation, 25 PuB. LAW. 10, 12-13 (2017).
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1. The Gratuity Approach
Perhaps the most unrealistic view of public employee pension
rights is the view taken in the states of Texas and Indiana which view
the pension as a gratuity or gratuitous allowance.151 The gratuity ap-
proach advances the idea that the public employer should have unfet-
tered discretion in determining the amount and availability of
retirement benefits.' In the 19th and early 20th century, public and
private employers considered this form of deferred compensation to
be truly discretionary and dependent on the continuing good will and
financial solvency of the employer.'53 The main legal theory support-
ing this view was that the employer's current promise of future retire-
ment income was a current gratuitous promise to make a future gift of
money.154 Viewed from the Texas perspective, the existence and char-
acter of pension rights would be a subject of legislative supremacy that
is: "made subject to the reserved power of the Legislature to amend,
modify, or repeal the law upon which the pension system is erected,
and this necessarily constitutes a qualification upon the anticipated
pension and a reserved right to terminate or diminish it.'
' 55
This position has been applied in an array of cases including one
holding that retiree pensions actually being received could legally be
reduced or terminated because they had "no vested rights in future
installments.'
56
151. IND. CONST. art. X, § 5; id. art. XI, § 12. See Bd. of Trs. of the Pub. Emps.' Ret. Fund v.
Hill, 472 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. 1985) and Ballard v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Pension Fund, 324 N.E.2d
813, 815 (Ind. 1975) ("The Court of Appeals correctly held that in Indiana pensions under a state
compulsory contribution plan like the Police Pension Fund have traditionally been considered
gratuities from the sovereign involving no agreement of the parties and, therefore, creating no
contractual rights.") This characterization generally applies to benefits received from "involun-
tary" retirement plans where "voluntary" plans are considered contract benefits. See also Kern
v. State, 10 N.E.2d 915 (Ind. 1937); Klamm v. State, 126 N.E.2d 487 (Ind. 1955).
152. R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Vested Right of Pensioner to Pension, 52 A.L.R.2d 437 (1957);
See also Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464, 470-72 (1889) (employee had no property interest in public
pension benefits because state retained the contribution in its retirement fund).
153. See, e.g., Eddy v. Morgan, 75 N.E. 174, 178 (1905) (Public pensions are "a bounty
springing from the graciousness and appreciation of sovereignty.").
154. Norman Stein, An Article of Faith: The Gratuity Theory of Pensions and Faux Church
Plans, EMa. BENEFITS COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER (Summer 2014).
155. This view was expressed by the Texas Supreme Court in City of Dallas v. Trammell, 101
S.W.2d 1009, 1014 (Tex. 1937) and recently affirmed in Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension
Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. 2015). The Fifth Circuit has consistently followed this view. See also
Van Houten v. City of Fort Worth, 827 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2016) and Kunin v. Feofanov, 69 F.3d
59, 63 (5th Cir. 1995).
156. Trammell, 101 S.W.2d at 1012-13. See also Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 17; Devon v. City of
San Antonio, 443 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ App. 1969); Jud v. City of San Antonio, 313 S.W.2d 903
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
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Curiously, the theory of "gratuity" pensions has not been at-
tacked as being unconstitutional under state laws; making gifts of gov-
ernment funds to private persons would seemingly violate the
prohibition on these gratuities.57 It would appear that unless some
superior state or federal constitutional rights were identified as pro-
tecting retirement benefits, the legislatures of Texas and Indiana
would seemingly be empowered to make restrictive pension policy
changes with great freedom, constrained mainly by limits of public
opinion.
2. The Promissory Estoppel View
Taking a unique legal view that is grounded in a sense of funda-
mental fairness towards employees, Minnesota has established a legal
framework for assessing public employee pension rights under the
theory of promissory estoppel. Recognized in the 1983 case of Chris-
tensen v. Minneapolis Municipal Employees' Retirement Board,58
the Minnesota Supreme Court established the doctrine in a case
where a municipal employee had existing pension benefits be sus-
pended under a new state law requiring a minimum age for retirement
pensions and applying it retroactively to the employee.159 Rather
than adopting the gratuity approach or the prevalent contractual view,
the Minnesota court announced a new approach and one that remains
identified with the state to this day."6 It holds that a reviewing court
must examine two questions in considering the lawfulness of a benefit
change: (1) what has been promised by the state; and (2) to what de-
gree and to what aspects of the promise has there been reasonable
157. TEX. CONST. art. 3, §51 ("The Legislature shall have no power to make any grant or
authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, association of individuals,
municipal or other corporations whatsoever... ") When a governmental entity is not liable on a
claim, the payment of that claim constitutes "a pure gift or donation" and violates the constitu-
tion. See Tompkins v. Williams, 62 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933); State v. City of
Austin, 331 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Tex. 1960). But see Spina v. Consol. Police & Firemen's Pension
Fund Comm'n, 197 A.2d 169, 175-76 (N.J. 1964) (pension benefits not a gratuity within state's
constitutional prohibition on donations).
158. Christensen v. Minneapolis Municipal Employees Retirement Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740
(Minn. Mar. 18, 1983).
159. Public Employee Pension Benefits-A Promissory Estoppel Approach-Christensen v.
Minneapolis Municipal Employees' Retirement Board, 331 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. 1983), 10 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 287, 288-289 (1984).
160. The Minnesota promissory estoppel approach has been adopted in a small number of
decisions outside of Minnesota. See City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1970);
Crumpler v. Bd. of Admin., 108 Cal. Rptr. 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Shafer v. State, 521 P.2d 736
(Wash. 1974).
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reliance on the part of the employee?a61 As the two-part framework
reveals, the promissory estoppel eschews a rigid and formalistic con-
tractual approach to existence of employee benefits to a more flexible
and contextual analysis. The Christensen viewpoint has been followed
since it was announced and it appears to be tied to the equity princi-
ples mentioned in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.62 Occa-
sionally Minnesota's idiosyncratic promissory estoppel analysis has
been argued in cases arising in other jurisdictions but usually without
success.163  Counsel for the challengers appear willing to advance a
range of theoretical arguments challenging pension benefit changes
hoping that the reviewing court will find one or more persuasive."
Some of these arguments have been extremely creative even if they
have not been successful.
165
3. The Property Approach
There are six states that are believed to have taken a Property
law approach to characterizing retirement benefits.166 Since state law
defines the existence and the features of individual ownership of
161. Christensen, 331 N.W.2d at 749.
162. Restatement (Second) Contracts §90 (1981).
163. See, e.g., Weaver v. Town of N. Castle, 153 A.D.3d 531 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (no reli-
ance and no promise for retiree health insurance); Vallejo Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Val-
lejo, 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (promissory estoppel theory derivative to failed
contract theory regarding retiree health insurance coverage); Christiansen v. Cty. of Douglas,
849 N.W.2d 493 (Neb. 2014) (equitable estoppel did not prevent increased in health insurance
premiums); Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 983 N.E.2d 375, 379 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012) (promissory
estoppel could not be invoked to challenge a city exercising a governmental function under state
law); S.D. City Firefighters, Local 145, AFL-CIO v. Bd. of Admin., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 860 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2012) (benefit adopted by city was void and the resolution enacting it did not give rise
to promissory estoppel right); Bishop v. City of Columbia, 738 S.E.2d 255 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013)
(estoppel claims rejected based on employee handbook and benefits booklet but accepted based
representations by supervisors); Myers v. W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd., 704 S.E.2d 738 (W.Va.
2010) (10 years of government service leads to presumption of detrimental reliance on benefits).
164. Hall v. Elected Officials' Ret. Plan, 383 P.3d 1107 (Ariz. 2016) (multiple legal theories
advanced but the case decided under state constitutional pension clause); Awdziewicz v. City of
Meriden, 115 A.3d 1084 (Conn. 2015) (multiple contract, equitable and constitutional theories
advanced but decided under the facts).
165. Moro v. State, 351 P.3d 1, 40-41 (Or. 2015) (legislation eliminating income tax offset
benefits to non-resident state retirees did not violate the U.S. Constitution's Privilege and Immu-
ities Clause); Myers, 704 S.E.2d at 738 (W.Va. 2010) (theory of contractual detrimental reliance
recognized although not found to exist in the case).
166. These states are: Maine, Wyoming, Connecticut, New Mexico, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
However, careful examination of opinions reveals some confusion over the accuracy of this sum-
mary. See Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 298 (N.M. 1995) (finding Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota,
New Jersey, and Rhode Island had recognized pensions as "important property interest(s) or
right.") Courts in other states occasionally will characterize retirees' benefits as property rights.
See N.Y. State Corr. Offs. & Police Benevolent Ass'n v. N.Y., 911 F. Supp. 2d 111 (N.D.N.Y.
2012).
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things of value, it is hardly surprising that these jurisdictions have used
this conceptual framework to analyze the employee retirement rights.
Most often this property characterization must be discerned from
court opinions that use terms such as "vested rights" or "statutorily
created property interest(s)" to describe the pension rights under re-
view.167 The property rights analysis is frequently undertaken as a
second-tier alternative discussion in court opinions concluding that
employees do not have contract rights to pension benefits. In this way
it replaces the contract characterization.
It is not difficult to apply this property view to retirees who cur-
rently receive pension income since they are enjoying the financial
transfer from an annuity "paid-for" by a working career. Considering
the situation presented by non-retired, currently employed workers
creates a more nuanced situation where the property is "earned" in
increments over time as basic pension rights first vest and then later,
additional units accrue. The concept of property is not bound to the
limited list of conventional forms including land, buildings, financial
assets, and personal property since as a legal concept, property is a
flexible idea dealing with the relationship between owners and the as-
sets they own expanding to meet new situations.168 Due to this flexi-
bility, making the property concept applicable to protect employee
and retiree pension rights is clearly within the prerogative of the
courts. As Professor Charles A. Reich wrote over 50 years ago in his
prescient article entitled, The New Property, "one of the most impor-
tant developments.. .has been the emergence of government as a ma-
jor source of wealth.'
'169
The states adopting the property view of retirement benefits
adopted this idea in a small number of court decisions the 1980s and
167. Pierce, 910 P.2d at 299-300, 302 (property rights that could later be made taxable).
168. Concerning the breadth of the property concept in American law, Justice Stanley Mosk
wrote a notable dissent in Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509 (Cal. 1990)
saying,
The concepts of property and ownership in our law are extremely broad ...A leading
decision of this court approved the following definition: 'The term "property" is suffi-
ciently comprehensive to include every species of estate, real and personal, and every-
thing which one person can own and transfer to another. It extends to every species of
right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place
a money value.'
169. Robert A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733, 733 (1964). He noted that "no
form of government largesse is more personal or individual than an old age pension .... No
form is more obviously a compulsory substitute for private property; .... No form is more relied
on, and more often thought of as property. No form is more vital to the independence and
dignity of the individual." Id. at 769. His prescription was to accord these new forms of property
legal protection.
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1990s.170 This property classification has often been done in a mud-
dled fashion with minimal analytical rigor. Finding the existence of a
property right is the predicate for the analysis under federal and state
constitutional law theory171 although many cases end at the start
through dismissal with the courts not finding that a property right ex-
ists.172 These property-based challenges arise under the authority of
the fifth and the fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution as
well as state constitutional analogues.173 While state law is the source
of property rights through their statutes, common law rules, constitu-
tions, and judicial opinions, the federal constitution imposes a floor
that limits how states and localities can affect these property rights.
These protections have been made applicable to the states for over a
century and there is no modem precedent for finding any state immu-
nity from these federal constitutional norms.
174
When considering a retirement policy change under substantive
due process, the first necessary element is the establishment of the
existence of an individual's property right that has been diminished or
adversely affected by some government action. While some state
courts have explicitly found pensions and other retirement benefits to
170. See Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 810 (Conn. 1985) (property interest in the ex-
isting state retirement fund which is protected from arbitrary state treatment by the Due Process
clause); Ass'n of State Prosecutors v. Milwaukee Cnty., 544 N.W.2d 888, 889 (Wis. 1996); Peter-
son v. Sweetwater Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One, 929 P.2d 525, 530 (Wyo. 1996); Spiller v. State, 627
A.2d 513, 515 n.12 (Me. 1993) (vague suggestion that pension benefits "may" constitute property
rights; no clear holding); Pierce, 910 P.2d at 302-03 (the right to receive benefits confers a prop-
erty right upon vesting but may be subject to later taxation); State ex rel. Horvath v. State
Teachers Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644, 655 (Ohio 1998).
171. See Van Houten, 827 F.3d at 539-40 (all aspects of the pension system were made sub-
ject to the reserve power of the legislature to amend, there was no vested property right). Ac-
cord Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 15-16.
172. Clifford v. Raimondo, 184 A.3d 673, 678 (R.I. 2018) (upholding a judgment approving a
class action settlement affecting retirement age and COLAs); Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Ur-
ban Cnty. Gov't, 60 F. Supp. 3d 772, 778 (E.D. Ky. 2014); Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, 151 F.
Supp. 3d 830, 839 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) (no property right exists in cost of living or COLA pension
adjustments), and Dodd, 846 F.3d at 187 (if the state has total discretion to award or remove a
benefit, a person cannot claim entitlement to the benefit). Both district court cases mentioned
were later affirmed by the 6th Circuit. See Puckett, 833 F.3d at 602-03; Frazier v. City of Chatta-
nooga, 841 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2016) (abandoning property arguments, the COLA is not a
vested financial benefit that is a contract right). However, some courts will ignore the entire
property rights issue to permit the plaintiff's case to survive a motion to dismiss. See Roberts,
911 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
173. U.S. Const. amend. V ("nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation"); U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law").
174. See Chi., B. & QR. Co. v. Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (incorporation of the fifth
amendment through the fourteen amendment).
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constitute property,175 in many cases the due process inquiry ended at
this initial stage with a decision that no vested property right existed
in the employees or retirees that made the challenge.176 As crucial as
this issue is to the property-based constitutional analysis, many courts
have struggled in their reasoning and often they have failed to provide
a coherent explanation of why the right does or does not exist.17 7
Since property is not created by constitutions, judges must look to
state law to answer questions about its existence. The U.S. Supreme
Court in Board of Regents v. Roth found that property interests were
"defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from.. .state
law rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that sup-
port claims of entitlement to those benefits.'
'1 78
Identifying these "understandings" in specific cases appears to be
extremely difficult when governments act to change the rules. Some
courts have been clearer than others in setting forth when property
interests exist although the analysis is often conclusory and not very
explanatory.179  As straightforward as this inquiry might appear in
states with a tradition of property characterization for pensions, some
courts do not extend the "property" label to policies which are consid-
ered to be peripheral to core pension benefits. This is especially true
with pension cost of living adjustments (COLAs), health insurance,
and tax exemptions for pension income. Narrowly construing the defi-
nition of a vested property right, only the base retiree pension has
been found to be a vested property right.'80  Some court opinions
175. See, e.g., Peterson, 929 P.2d at 530 (legitimate retirement expectations may constitute
property rights that may not be deprived without due process of law); Madison Teachers, Inc. v.
Walker, 11CV3774*26-27 (Dane Cnty. Cir. Ct. 2012) (challenge to state law shifting pension
contributions to workers a "legitimate claim" but no due process arbitrariness or irrationality
shown); Konicki v. Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund, No. 4-17-0056, 2018 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 334 **2, at
*7 (lI. March 2, 2018) (total confusion about whether an employee had a vested property or
contract right to a pension system feature).
176. Duncan v. Muzyn, 833 F.3d 567, 583-84 (6th Cir. 2016) (reducing COLA found not
unconstitutionally taken since they are not a "cognizable property interest" because COLAs are
not "vested"); Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, 151 F.Supp.3d at 838-39 (no legally cognizable
contract or property right in a higher COLA found); N.Y. State Corr. Officers & Police Benevo-
lent Ass'n v. N.Y., 911 F. Supp. 2d 111, 148 (N.D. N.Y. 2012) (no property interests found even
though the employees constitutional claim survives a motion to dismiss).
177. For examples of a more thoughtful consideration of the property interest existence as
well as the due process issues, see Puckett, 833 F.3d at 603; Hussey v. Milwaukee Cty., 740 F.3d
1139, 1142-43 (7th Cir. 2014).
178. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
179. See, e.g., Pierce, 910 P.2d at 302 (concluding that state statutes "create vested property
rights" that do not "mature" until the final statutory condition is met).
180. Bartlett v. Cameron, 316 P.3d 889, 896 (N.M. 2013) (retirement benefits protected by
the state constitution are property rights but COLAs or tax emptions for pensions are not).
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have restricted the recognition of property rights created by statutes
in the same way they have limited the finding of contractual pension
rights- by setting a high presumption against finding the existence of
these rights.'' Without showing an "unmistakable" legislative inten-
tion to create a binding right, no cognizable property interest might be
found, thereby terminating the due process and takings analysis.
182
Without finding a vested property right, courts effectively conclude
that the governmental employer may change the retirement benefit to
the employee's disadvantage. With so many cases not finding the exis-
tence of a property right, it is not surprising that these fifth and four-
teenth amendment challenges largely have failed.'" 3
a. Pension Reforms as Unconstitutional Denials of Property Rights
without Due Process of Law
Once courts have recognized a property right in a pension bene-
fit, they use two forms of constitutional analysis to evaluate the law-
fulness of the government actions restricting it. These are: 1) due
process and 2) the taking of property principles derived from the four-
teenth and fifth amendments of the U.S. Constitution and their state
constitutions.184 Due process arguments have been the most common
form of "property-based" constitutional review with courts using both
substantive and procedural branches of due process analysis.'5 Both
181. Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1163 (N.J. 2016) (vested rights created by statute re-
quires a "clear indication" to meet the "heightened standard"); Borders v. City of Atlanta, 779
S.E.2d. 279, 284 (Ga. 2015) (no legislative statement recognizing vested pension rights nor a
reduction or termination of existing pension rights); Dodd, 846 F.3d at 187 (no property right in
a death benefit because there was no entitlement due to the fact that the city had the discretion
to remove the benefit).
182. Duncan, 833 F.3d at 583. But see Degan v. Bd. Of Trs. Of the Dal. Police and Fire Pen.
Sys., Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-01596-N (U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Tex., Mar. 14, 2018) (retirement
plan balance considered to be a vested property right).
183. Degan, Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-01596-N (U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Texas, March 14, 2018)
(no procedural or substantive due process or takings claim shown in retirement fund change).
184. This argument has also been used in private sector pension cases reaching the U.S.
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 720
(1984) (applying due process rational basis review on changes to private sector pension benefits).
Some recent cases have even employed refinements to these two property-based constitutional
theories. See AFT Mich. v. State, 866 N.w.2d 782, 785 (Mich. 2015) (whether a state retiree
healthcare insurance policy change imposed an unconstitutional condition and finding none).
185. For examples of a procedural due process claim, see Hipsher v. L.A. Cty. Emps. Ret.
Ass'n, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 564, 569 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (retirement benefit forfeiture of vested
pension denied procedural due process); Puckett, 833 F.3d at 606-08 (rejected a claim that legis-
lation was improperly adopted by the state); Frazier, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 839 (failed claim since
the pension policy was adopted by legislative action and that was all the "process" required);
Pierce, 910 P.2d at 304 (usual legislative process provides adequate notice of change and oppor-
tunity to participate through the political process). But see Leff v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 210 F.
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federal and state constitutional arguments have been made often with
a blend of federal and state constitutional provisions cited.186 While
the substantive due process approach has been more common than
the procedural due process theory, it has employed a variety of "ra-
tional basis" approaches with each testing the sufficiency of the justifi-
cations provided for retirement benefit program alterations. 7 With
economic and social values at stake, low-level due process scrutiny
usually has been applied by the courts,' which has been a relatively
easy standard for state policy changes to satisfy. As the Michigan Su-
preme Court noted, substantive due process claims face "an exceed-
ingly high hurdle of demonstrating that the law is unreasonable" and
that the government policy is "not reasonably related to a legitimate
government interest."'8 9 Justifications offered by the government
based on the state or locality's need to maintain its pension fund sol-
vency and to resolve financial deficiencies have provided courts with
an adequate "rational basis."'9 ° As a result, due process scrutiny has
been consistently undemanding and courts have been unwilling to
question policy judgments shifting financial resources away from
worker benefits and towards other priorities.'9'
Supp. 3d 1242, 1250 (D. Nev. 2016) (upholding claim that loss of property right in post-proba-
tionary status without notice or due process).
186. In Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 15, the Texas Due Course of Law provision found in Tex.
Const. art. I, § 19 was argued while the Texas Supreme Court equated the federal due process
norms with the Texas Due Course of Law constitutional concept. See also Hussey, 740 F.3d at
1142 (takings theory is the same under both United States and Wisconsin constitutions).
187. A few courts have also used an equal protection critique when programs have distin-
guished between different categories of employees or retirees in pension benefits and while
others have added § 1983 claims seeking damages and attorneys' fees. See In re Request for
Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 806 N.W.2d 683, 706 (Mich. 2011) (advisory
opinion on a statute reducing or eliminating a state tax exemption on public pensions). See also
Teamsters Local 97 v. State, 84 A.3d 989, 1006-08 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (law requir-
ing employees to makes contributions for health benefits did not violate equal protection);
Awdziewicz, 115 A.3d at 1088 (suit in response to reduction in pension benefits include constitu-
tional claims enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
188. Under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution, government ac-
tion may not deny an individual liberty or property interests without providing the equal protec-
tion and due process of law. Laws impacting fundamental freedoms or making suspect
classifications may be reviewed under a tightened strict scrutiny review. Under rational basis
review, a law or policy having adverse social or economic effects may be challenged requiring the
government to justify its action by showing that the law advances a legitimate government objec-
tive. Generally, this is an easy standard to meet and most rational basis challenges fail. See
generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law- Principles and Policies § 9.2.1-§ 9.2.3 (5th
ed.2015).
189. AFT Mich., 866 N.W.2d at 808 & 810 (requiring mandatory employee salary contribu-
tion for retiree health care benefit).
190. See Puckett, 833 F.3d at 608-609. But see Welch v. Brown, 935 F. Supp. 2d 875, 886-87
(E.D. Mich. 2013) (entitlement to health care benefits protected by due process).
191. AFT Mich., 866 N.W.2d at 810.
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Even though pension benefits have been publicly viewed as cru-
cial elements to worker's retirement income and health insurance sup-
port, they have never been found to be "fundamental rights" by
judges. The "fundamental rights" characterization would allow courts
to impose a strict scrutiny standard of review requiring higher levels of
government justification for restrictive policy changes. It would also
shift the burden to the government for demonstrating a greater neces-
sity. It seems doubtful that in the future state courts would wish to
insert themselves in the contentious political battle over pension re-
form cut backs.
b. Pension Reforms as an Unconstitutional Taking of Private
Property
Arguments have also been made that state pension reform poli-
cies reducing or changing benefits have unconstitutionally taken em-
ployee and retiree property rights.1" Borrowing from the late
twentieth century U.S. Supreme Court case precedent principally ap-
plying the fifth amendment akings doctrine to land use and environ-
mental regulation, this constitutional argument has claimed that
recent pension reform policies have "taken" the property rights of
employees and retirees.93 These fifth amendment cases have usually
focused on regulatory takings or regulatory condition issues and any
use of them in pension benefit cases would require careful analysis
and argument by analogy to be effective.
As with the substantive due process claims, the taking arguments
against pension reform must begin with the identification of a private
property interest owned by the plaintiffs that has been "taken" by the
defendant governmental employer. Plaintiffs often fail at this stage in
192. Cherry, 762 F.3d at 369; Van Houten, 827 F.3d at 539; Hussey, 740 F.3d at 1142; Dodd,
846 F.3d at 180; Frazier, 841 F.3d at 438; City of Hollywood v. Bien, 209 So.3d 1, 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2016); AFT Mich., 866 N.w.2d at 802; Bartlett v. Cameron, 316 P.3d 889, 896 (N.M. 2013);
Scott v. Williams, 107 So.3d 379, 381 (Fla. 2013); Puckett, 833 F.3d at 610; Crosby v. City of
Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 641 (4th Cir. 2011); Welch, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 886-887 (claim that life-
time health care benefits were property).
193. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 123-38 (1978) (setting forth a three
factor test for finding a governmental taking of real property); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982) (applying a per se takings test for physical appropria-
tion of real property); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992) (defining a
taking as regulation that inflicts a total taking or destruction of real property); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391-93 (1994) (government conditions on property use must bear rough
proportionality to harm caused by property use); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,
484-90 (2004) (allowing the use of government eminent domain to take property for public
purposes and not public use).
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establishing a property interest. Since the fifth amendment only ap-
plies to governmental action, the pension reform policy must be
shown to destroy an existing private property right in order to be held
an unconstitutional takings of property for which "just compensation"
must be paid.'94 In comparison to the due process attacks which con-
sider the adequacy of the "rational basis" for the government's action
and weigh the sufficiency of the policy basis, the takings argument
focuses on the destructive effect of the governmental action on a
property right owned by the employee or retiree.
In the few recent cases considering this property-based claim,
very few courts do a careful analysis under the prevailing takings law
precedent.195 These takings challenges are often argued in cases as-
serting multiple litigation theories; in most circumstances, these cases
are usually resolved on other grounds with limited legal analysis of the
taking issue.9 6 One theme mentioned in a number of the taking deci-
sions has been that the benefit change to be a permissible prospective
change to the retirement plan and that no taking or contract infringe-
ment had occurred.197 Another view was that since no enforceable
contract right existed in a benefit, there could be no property interest
that could be taken in violation of the fifth amendment.198 None of
this property rights oriented litigation has been successful in invalidat-
ing new pension reform policies with both federal and state courts
usually rejecting both procedural and substantive due process as well
as taking arguments.
In conclusion, recent case holdings indicate that a property char-
acterization of retirement benefits provides workers and employees
very little legal protection from policy changes that reduce employee
194. U.S. Const. Amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.")
195. But see Degan, Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-01596-N, 13-19 (Mar. 14, 2018) (reasoned
analysis finding no per se or regulatory taking of property in a change to the city's deferred
retirement option plan); State ex rel. Horvath, 697 N.E.2d at 651 (completing a Penn Central
analysis). In one situation the government attempted to use federal takings law to delay a court
decision. In Welch v. Brown, the government employer argued that the employees' due process
and takings claims were not ripe because they had not sought compensation through a state
inverse condemnation procedure. 935 F. Supp. 2d at 886-887. The district court rejected that
defense finding "no case law to support" the state position. Id
196. Moro, 357 Ore. at 233 (case decided without considering federal and state constitution
Takings Clause claims); City of Hollywood, 209 So. 3d at 3; Hall, 383 P.3d at 1117 (decided
without reaching the takings analysis).
197. Duncan, 833 F.3d at 583-84 (no property interest found); City of Hollywood, 209 So.3d
at 3; Scott, 107 So.3d at 381-82.
198. Cherry v. Mayor of Balt. City, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134772 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2012),
rev'd in Cherry, 762 F.3d at 374.
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benefits.1 99 This legal categorization is relatively uncommon and liti-
gation rarely applies the usual constitutional law protections that have
been accorded to conventional forms of property like land and
buildings.
4. The Contract Approach
The most natural and most common interpretation of a public
employee's pension rights is that they represent an element of de-
ferred compensation that has been paid to the worker as an implied or
express benefit included in their contract of employment. The clear
majority of states categorize public employee pensions and retirement
benefits as a form of contract right. However, there is great variation
in the legal theory employed as the basis for these important rights
and sometimes there are differences in explanations within the same
state's jurisprudence. Three explanatory categories have emerged in
state law defining the existence of retirement benefits as contract
rights: 1) a state constitutional recognition of public employee retire-
ment benefits as contract rights,2°° 2) state statutes identifying these
forms of worker employment compensation as contracts,20 1 and 3)
court decisions finding contracts to exist employing a "facts and cir-
cumstances" type of analysis considering many factors including col-
lective bargaining agreements.2 °2 A court's conclusion that retirement
benefits are contractual in nature only begins the analysis.2 °3 Once
that conclusion has been made, complex interpretive questions follow
often requiring courts to analyze litigated issues in terms of an inter-
woven pattern of state constitutions, statutes, regulations, and prior
case decisions.
199. Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, University of
Minnesota Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-13 at 30 (Mar. 17, 2010).
200. See infra note 192.
201. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.692(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (benefits pre-2014 hired
employees constitute an inviolable contract of the Commonwealth, and the benefits provided
therein shall, except as provided in KRS § 6.696, not be subject to reduction or impairment by
alteration, amendment, or repeal.); Wis. Stat. § 40.19(1) (2013) (rights exercised and benefits
accrued to an employee under this chapter for service rendered shall be due as a contractual
right and shall not be abrogated by any subsequent legislative act.).
202. Ambrose v. City of White Plains, No. 10-CV-4946, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56309, at
*1-6, *29-40, *39 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (no contract found to exist).
203. A number of judicial decisions end with a finding that no contract right exists and no
analysis of the legality of the benefit change is justified. See Dodd, 846 F.3d at 185 (no contract
right to a default death benefit). But see Roberts, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 176 (plaintiffs proved the
existence of a contract right to survive a motion to dismiss).
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Litigation in these "contract" jurisdictions usually focuses on two
important questions: 1) what is the scope or content of the contract
related to retirement benefits and 2) are the modifications of pre-ex-
isting benefits providing less generous or more restricted worker enti-
tlements lawful and, ultimately, enforceable? The first of these
questions addresses a myriad of practical issues affecting all aspects of
public employee retirement pensions and other benefits. What are
the elements of the employment contract and what is its term? Sev-
eral recent cases provide examples of these content questions and
they have considered are range of issues including what working in-
come is includible when calculating pension amounts,°4 which retire-
ment system applies when there has been a change,20 5 does a new
collective bargaining agreement increase retiree health insurance pre-
miums,20 6 and what terms of pension calculations apply to certain em-
ployees?20 7 Questions related to the employment contract's period of
coverage also presents courts with a range of challenging issues. Is the
agreement permanent providing for continuous and long-lasting em-
ployee benefits or does it represent a segmented series of contracts
each possessing different terms?2 8 These cases raise complicated in-
terpretive issues of contractual composition and often require courts
to undertake a wide ranging analysis.20 9
The second question that courts have confronted in pension re-
form litigation in these "contract" states deals with the legality of leg-
islation or administrative action reducing worker retirement benefits.
Lawsuits challenging the lawfulness of these reductions have been
common and have occurred widely since 2008. This legal issue as-
204. Office of Admin. v. State Emps. Ret. Bd., 180 A.3d 740, 753 (Pa. 2018) (are union
stipends income).
205. Lynch v. City of N.Y., 162 A.D.3d 589, 591 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (no service credit is
given for correction officer's child care leave); McGlynn v. Cal., 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 470, 478 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (do pre-PEPRA or post-PEPRA amendment rules apply to state judges).
Along these lines, some cases have challenged the procedure required for the adoption of a
pension policy. See City of Danville v. Garrett, 803 S.E.2d 326, 328-29 (Va. 2017) (non-applica-
tion of state statute requiring police 2/3 disability pension).
206. In re New Brunswick Mun. Emps. Ass'n, 182 A.3d 394, 402-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2018) (can a CBA impose higher retiree premiums in excess of statutory maximum).
207. New Orleans Fire Fighters Pen. & Relief Fund v. City of New Orleans, 242 So. 3d 682,
696 (La. Ct. App. 2018) (upholding trustee's decision to apply a higher compensation percentage
to the calculation).
208. Wood, 818 F.3d at 1248-49 (finding that vested contract for retiree health care was a
series of contracts and not one lifetime contract).
209. Sometimes courts simply treat the matter as a breach of contract action and award dam-
ages if they find a breach. See Bd. of Trs. of Harvey Firefighters' Pension Fund v. City of Har-
vey, 96 N.E.3d 1, 49 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (city failed to adequately fund pension fund and
damages were awarded).
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sumes clarity in the meaning of the terms of the revised employment
contracts but these cases consider challenges to the legality of the ac-
tion changing benefits. Rather than directly suing the government
employer for breach of contract,21 ° the overwhelming majority of
these "legality" cases presents a state or federal constitutionally-based
claim that the pension policy change "impairs" an existing contract
right of workers and, therefore, violates the Contract Clause of the
relevant constitution.211 The remedial result sought by the employees
challenging the state pension policy change is a judicial declaration
that the modification is unconstitutional and, presumably, a nullity or
void. Using the federal Contracts Clause also seeks to use federal
supremacy principles to invalidate state policy decisions212 although
state contract clause cases generally follow a similar analysis but
sometimes employ a state constitutional rationale.213
The Contract Clause analysis requires that a valid contract pro-
viding worker benefits exists and that the contract has been unconsti-
tutionally "impaired" by state action. Recent case holdings have
demonstrated that a very large number of courts wish to avoid the
entire Contract Clause inquiry holding that workers or retirees do not
have an enforceable contract right to pension and retirement bene-
210. The availability of a state law breach of contract damage remedy would presumably bar
a Contracts Clause claim and several federal courts have so held. See e.g., Cherry, 762 F.3d at
371; Horwitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chi., 78 F.3d 1248, 1252 (7th Cir. 1996); TM Park Ave.
Assocs. v. Pataki, 214 F.3d 344, 349 (2d Cir. 2000); Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 682 F.Supp.2d
537, 543-44 (W.D. N.C. 2010). Another line of cases has held changing state and local law
affects a breach of contract that constitutes an impairment of contract. See E&E Hauling, Inc. v.
Forest Pres. Dist., 613 F.2d 675, 680-81 (7th Cir. 1980). Perhaps the best legal outcome would be
to avoid the constitutional question if a statutory or common law remedy were available.
211. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (No State shall.. .pass any... Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts ... ). State constitutions also contain versions of the federal constitutional clause.
See Tex. Const. art. 16, § 66(d). See also GEORGE D. BRADEN ET AL., Tim CONSTITUTION OF
THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1977) (37 other state
constitutions have contract impairment clauses).
212. Some have speculated that the U.S. Constitution's 11th Amendment sovereign immu-
nity concepts limit the use of the federal courts for this purpose. See Paul M. Secunda, Whither
the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 1101, 1111 n.59 (2008)
("[S]tate employers may be able to avail themselves of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment, and responsible agents of the employers may be able to avoid individual damages
liability if they show they are eligible for qualified immunity, though they may still be subject to
injunctive relief"). Recent federal cases ignore this potential defense often citing Carter v.
Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322 (1885) (stating that the individual has a right to have a judicial
determination declaring the nullity of the attempt to impair its obligation).
213. See, e.g., Dannenberg v. State, 383 P.3d 1177, 1180 (Haw. 2016) (under state Contracts
Clause), Moro v. State, 351 P.3d 1 (Or. 2015) (state Contracts Clause analysis of COLA change);
AFT Mich. v. State, 866 N.W.2d 782, 802 (Mich. 2015) (federal and state constitutions consid-
ered in health care and pension challenge); Vaughn v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss., 182 So.3d
433, 437 (Miss. 2015).
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fits.2 14 Courts reach this conclusion in a wide variety of ways includ-
ing: finding a lack of clarity in legislation creating the contract right,215
a temporary nature or unenforceability of the benefit,2 16 the prospec-
tive nature of the right,217 the employee's ability to opt out of the
impaired system,218 and an unsatisfied contractual vesting require-
ment.219 It is striking just how many recent court decisions employ this
tactic to deny employees recovery and to completely avoid Contracts
Clause analysis.
Once a contract right is found to exist, the Contracts Clause claim
will be analyzed focusing on the following two principal questions: (1)
is there proof that a state policy or law change has affected a "substan-
214. Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 211 (Colo. 2014) (no contract right to COLA); Underwood
v. City of Chi., 779 F.3d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 2015) (no contract right to enduring health care
benefits); Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't., 833 F.3d 590, 600 (6th Cir. 2016) (no
vested contract right to COLA); Me. Ass'n. of Retirees v. Bd. of Trs., 758 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir.
2014) (no contract right to COLA); Christiansen v. Cty., 849 N.W.2d 493, 508 (Neb. 2014) (no
contract right to maintaining health care premium); Am. Fed. of Teachers v. State, 111 A.3d 63,
73 (N.H. 2015) (no contract right to calculating earnable compensation); Berg v. Christie, 137
A.3d 1143, 1164 (N.J. 2016) (no contract right to COLA); R.I. Council 94 v. R.I., 705 F. Supp. 2d
165, 182-83 (D.R.I. 2010) (no contract right to health benefits); Bishop v. City of Columbia, 738
S.E.2d 255. 258 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013) (no contract right to health benefits); Frazier v. City of
Chattanooga, 841 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2016) (no contract right to COLA); Dodd v. City of
Chattanooga, 846 F.3d 180, 185 (6th Cir. 2017) (no contract right to COLA); Schwegel v. Mil-
waukee Cty., 859 N.W.2d 78, 90 (Wis. 2015) (no contract right to Medicare reimbursement); In
re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2011 P.A. 38, 806 N.W.2d 683,
698-702 (Mich. 2011) (no contract right to tax exemption for pension income).
215. See, e.g., Cranston Firefighters v. Raimondo, 880 F.3d 44, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2018) (unmis-
takability doctrine not satisfied); Leff v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 210 F. Supp.3d 1242 (D. Nev.
2016) (no statutory text offered to prove contract); Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, 841 F.3d 433,
436 (6th Cir. 2016) (no unmistakable contract right to COLA); Me. Ass'n. of Retirees v. Bd. of
Trs., 758 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2014) (no unmistakable intent to create a contract right); Am. Fed'n of
Teachers v. State, 111 A.3d 63 (N.H. 2015) (presumption is that no legislative intent to create a
contract right); Prof'l Firefighters of N.H. v. State, 107 A.3d 1229, 1234-35 (N.H. 2014) (no un-
mistakable intent to create a contract right); N.J. Educ. Ass'n. v. State 989 A. 2d 282 (N.J. Super.
App. 2010) (no contract right absent clear indication of legislative intent to create a contract
right); Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143 (N.J. 2016) (no finding of legislative unequivocal intent to
create a contract right); Retired Public Emps. Ass'n., Inc. v. Cuomo, 123 A.D.3d 92 (N.Y.
App.Div. 2014) (no words of contract to signal an intent to create a contract right); Gamel v.
Cincinnati, 983 N.E.2d 375 (Ohio App. 2012) (no clear indication of legislative intent to con-
tract); Fry v. City of L.A., 199 Cal. Rptr.3d 694 (Cal. App. 2016) (legislative intent to create a
contract must clearly appear and all doubts resolved in favor of the power of government).
216. Aquirre v. State, 891 N.W.2d 516, 526-27 (Ct. App. Mich., 2016); AFT Mich. v. State,
866 N.W.2d 782, 806-07 (Mich. 2015).
217. City of Hollywood v. Bien, 209 So.3d 1, 5-6 (Fla. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2016).
218. AFT Mich. v. State, 866 N.W.2d 782, 803 (Mich. 2015).
219. Borders v. City of Atlanta, 779 S.E.2d 279, 286 (Ga. 2015) (stating that increased em-
ployee contribution to pension plan was not unconstitutional since it worked prospectively); see
also Rieder v. Milwaukee Cty., No. 2014AP496, 2015 Wisc. App. LEXIS 465, at *12 (Wis. Ct.
App. June 30, 2015) (stating that contract right to health care benefit does not vest until
retirement).
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tial impairment of a contractual relationship,"22 and (2) is the state
law "appropriate... and reasonable" and designed to advance a "sig-
nificant and legitimate public purpose."'221 Recent U.S. Supreme
Court Contract Clause decisions have reinforced the analytical ap-
proach using these twin inquiries.222
The first hurdle that must be overcome is successfully proving
that the pension reform measure constitutes a "substantial impair-
ment of a contractual relationship." There could be many kinds of
contract changes both large and small that could constitute an impair-
ment of the contract. The critical point would be a court's finding that
the contract modification was "substantial" in nature since a "non-
substantial" impairment would not be barred by the Contract Clause.
As Justice Kagan wrote in Sveen v. Melin, the substantiality of the
impairment should be evaluated by "the extent to which the law un-
dermines the contractual bargain, interferes with a party's reasonable
expectations, and prevents the party from safeguarding . . . his
rights. ' 22 3 In one case, a federal court granted a preliminary injunction
after finding a substantial impairment when an employer imposed
large increases in deductibles and co-payments for retiree health care
benefits under an agreement.224 Another case found that the plaintiffs
had proved both that a contract right to retiree health insurance ex-
isted and that the right had been substantially impaired by retiree cost
increases sufficiently to survive a motion to dismiss.2 5 Many other
decisions fail to find substantial impairment with little discussion or
sometimes confusing analysis unrelated to the Contracts Clause.22 6
Although sounding as though it requires a careful judicial appraisal of
220. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978).
221. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. P.& L. Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983).
222. See Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1818 (upholding a Minnesota statute automatically
revoking a life insurance beneficiary designation upon divorce).
223. Id. at 1822 (citing Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 244). Some state courts also
apply a gloss to the "substantial impairment" element by negating that conclusion if the pension
benefit reduction is offset by a corresponding benefit. See Cloutier v. State, 42 A.3d 816, 826
(N.H. 2012) (adopting the offset standard).
224. Welch v. Brown, 935 F. Supp. 2d 875, 882 (E.D. Mich. 2013). See also Andrews v. Lom-
bardi, No. KC-13-1128, 2017 R.I. Super. LEXIS 31, at *65 (RI. Super. Feb. 2, 1017) (COLA
reductions represented substantial impairments).
225. Roberts v. N.Y., 911 F. Supp. 2d 149, 177-78 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).
226. Ambrose v. City of White Plains, No. 10-CV-4946, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56309, at
*16-19 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2018) (finding no substantial impairment hypothetically after finding
no impairment due to the availability of damages). Other cases use the Contract Clause language
of "substantial impairment" but completely fail to undertake the usual constitutional analysis.
See e.g., Borders v. City of Atlanta, 779 S.E.2d 279, 287 (Ga. 2015); AFT Mich. V. State, 866
N.W.2d 782, 802 (Mich. 2015); Scott v. Williams, 107 So.3d 379, 386-89 (Fla. 2013).
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the impact of a change in benefits, this test actually has presented the
courts with a great deal of discretion in making their judgment call
about "substantiality." Relying on the Supreme Court's statements
that contractual impairment occurs when "[l]egislation ... alters the
contractual relationship between the parties"'227 and "deprives one of
the benefit of a contract, or adds new duties or obligations
thereto.. "2218 decisions from the 1980s and 1990s appeared to make
this element relatively easy to satisfy with state changes to public pen-
sion systems triggering this factor.229 Case decisions during the last
decade have been highly variable in their results but the clear trend
has been away from finding "substantial impairment" when public
employee retirement rights are narrowed230 making this first prong of
the Contracts Clause argument very difficult to prove.
Ruling that a state or local government pension benefit change
does constitute a "substantial impairment" of workers' and retirees'
contract rights is merely the initial step in the Contract Clause analy-
sis. A court's determination that such an adverse change had oc-
curred does not by its own force require the finding of a constitutional
violation. Assuming that a "substantial impairment" has been found,
the second factor in this analysis places the burden on the government
employer to demonstrate that he policy change is "reasonable and
necessary to serve an important public purpose.'23 1 Such an open-en-
ded standard is obviously subject to a wide range of judicial interpre-
tation with some courts simply ruling that adverse changes were
227. Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 240.
228. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. State, 208 U.S. 583, 591 (1908).
229. See Valdes v. Cory, 139 Ca. App. 3d 773, 783 (Cal. App. 1983); Deonier v. State, 760
P.2d 1137, 1143 (Id. 1988).
230. See generally Wash. Educ. Ass'n v. Wash. Dept. of Ret. Sys., 332 P.3d 428, 436 (Wash.
2014); Kendall v. Gov't. of the V.I., 596 F. App'x 150 (3d Cir. 2015); Bd. of Admin. v. Wilson, 52
Cal. App. 4th 1109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541 (Neb. 1995).
231. U.S. Tr. Co. v. N.J., 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977). This decision is frequently cited for the analyt-
ical framework for pension policy changes reducing benefits. The case notes that "reasonable-
ness" should be determined considering the degree of contractual impairment, the unforeseeable
effects of the existing contract, and that no less drastic change could have achieved the same
legislative policy objective. Id. at 27, 29-31. Its standard suggests much greater protection of
retirement benefits than actually exists in the recent cases.
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reasonable232 and a few others scrutinizing legislative policy alterna-
tives much more rigorously.33
Earlier analysis of the Contracts Clause litigation challenging
pension reform measures suggested that this approach of constitu-
tional theory might impose serious limits to state and local govern-
ment policy flexibility in dealing with pension reform.234 Some cases
even repeated the U.S. Trust v. New Jersey dicta indicating that the
Contracts Clause should be more rigorously enforced against a state
when it seeks to impair its own contracts with its workers.35 However,
this has not been the case over the last decade. Advocates for public
workers and retirees have continued using this "impairment of con-
tract" Contracts Clause approach in their ongoing challenges to
changing law and policy in more than 60 reported cases since 2009.
Unfortunately for their clients, employing this most common and pre-
viously successful litigation theory has been a largely futile effort
achieving very few court victories with 85-90% of the reported deci-
sions upholding the states' policies against these constitutional chal-
lenges and rejecting worker claims.
5. State Constitutional Protections
Several states have adopted constitutional provisions specifically
giving security to public employee pension benefits.236 These provi-
232. Marin Ass'n. of Pub. Emps. v. Man Cty. Emps.' Ret. Ass'n., 2 Cal. App. 5th 674, 708-
09 (Cal. App. 2016). Some decisions use terms like "reasonableness" in a general sense unteth-
ered to the Contracts Clause to reach their holdings. See Dannenberg v. State of Haw., 383 P.3d
1177, 1196 (Haw. 2016).
233. See generally Moro v. State, 351 P.3d 1, 41 (Or. 2015), Roberts v. N.Y., 911 F. Supp. 2d
149, 180-82 (N.D.N.Y 2012); Stone v. N.C., 664 S.E.2d 32, 43 (N.C. App. 2008); Andrews, 2017
R.I. Super. LEXIS at *72-85.
234. Amy Monahan, Understanding the Legal Limits on Public Pension Reform at 2, Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute, (May 2013) ("once a court finds an employee's right to her public re-
tirement benefits to be contractual, it is generally unconstitutional for a state to take any action
that substantially impairs the employee's benefits").
235. U.S. Trust Co. further noted that "a State is not completely free to consider impairing
the obligations of its own contracts on a par with other policy alternatives." U.S. Tr. Co., 431
U.S. at 30-31. It continued "complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness
and necessity is not appropriate because the State's self-interest is at stake." Id. at 25-26.
236. Alaska Const. art. XII, §7 ("membership in employee retirement systems of the State or
its political subdivisions shall constitute a contractual relationship. Accrued benefits of these
systems shall not be diminished or impaired"); Ariz. Const. art. XXIX, §1 ("membership in a
public retirement system is a contractual relationship that is subject to [the state impairment of
contracts clause"); Haw. Const. art. XVI, §2 (membership in any employees' retirement system
of the State or any political subdivision thereof shall be a contractual relationship, the accrued
benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired); Ill. Const. art. XIII, §5 (membership in
any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or
any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the bene-
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sions, often similarly phrased, are focused upon the specific worker
retirement rights and they do not rely upon the more general constitu-
tional prohibitions against the impairment of contracts that were dis-
cussed in the prior section.37 The language employed in these state
constitutional provisions is often surprisingly direct and unambiguous.
For example, Hawaii's constitution provides that "membership in any
employees' retirement system of the State or any political subdivision
thereof shall be a contractual relationship, the accrued benefits of
which shall not be diminished or impaired.' 238 The power of this con-
stitutional provision obviously lies in the meaning of the words "di-
minished or impaired." In this example, the Hawaiian provision has
been interpreted as only protecting past accruals of pension rights as
they are earned while reserving the right of state employers to change,
and possibly reduce, future benefits.239 Texas has a similar provi-
sion.24 ° Although these provisions are constitutional in nature, akin to
similar provisions of law, they find specific meaning through court de-
cisions interpreting them. Interpretation of state constitutional pro-
tections and parsing of the state's jurisprudence has enormous social
and economic impact making dry pension rights decisions infused with
powerful political implications.24'
fits of which shall not be diminished or impaired); Mich. art. IX, §24 ("the accrued financial
benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions
shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby");
N.Y. Const. art. V, §7 ("membership in any pension or retirement system of the state or of a civil
division thereof shall be a contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished
or impaired"); Tex. Const. art. XVI, §66 (service retirement benefits may not be reduced or
impaired except on a prospective basis).
237. See e.g., Colo. Const., art. II, §11; Fla. Const., art. I, §10; Ga. Const., art. I, §1, IX; Miss.
Const. art. 3, §16. But see Neb. Const., art. III, §19 ("nothing in this section shall prevent local
governing bodies from reviewing and adjusting vested pension benefits periodically as prescribed
by ordinance").
238. Mich. Const. art. IX, §24 (the accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retire-
ment system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof
which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.); Haw. Const. art. XVI, §2 ("membership in
any employees' retirement system of the State or any political subdivision thereof shall be a
contractual relationship, the accrued benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired"); La.
Const. art. 10, §29 (A) ("membership in such a retirement system shall be a contractual relation-
ship between employee and employer, and the state shall guarantee benefits payable to a mem-
ber or retiree or to his lawful beneficiary upon his death").
239. See Ass'n. of Prof'l & Tech. Emps. v. City of Detroit, 398 N.W.2d 436, 454 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1986); Smith v. Bd. of Tr. of La. State Emps. Ret. Sys., 851 So. 2d 1100, 1105 (La. 2003).
240. Tex. Const. art. XVI, §66 (service retirement benefits may not be reduced or impaired
except on a prospective basis).
241. Not all court decisions under these constitutional provisions favor the employees. See
Eddington v. Tomasovic, No. 05-15-00839-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 13204, at *1 (Tex. App.
5th Dec. 13, 2016) (holding that Texas constitutional pension protection does not extend to fu-
ture interest rate applied to benefits).
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Not all constitutions are alike in their coverage. Several other
states' constitutional provisions have even broader reach asserting
protections for both accrued and future benefits having the effect of
"freezing" benefits at the level expected on the first day of employ-
ment. This sweeping policy means that a retirement system could not
be altered in a manner that would reduce or lessen employee retire-
ment benefits from the level that would have been received in the
plan in place on the first day of employment. Such a provision would
have a tremendous benefit to employees when later state legislation
reduces retirement benefits available to workers and several recent
cases have so held.242 The states of Illinois and New York have consti-
tutional provisions specifically setting forth this policy.2 4 3 The Illinois
Constitution provides that "membership in any pension or retirement
system... shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the bene-
fits of which shall not be diminished or impaired."2" Alaska and Ari-
zona have constitutional sections that have been interpreted in the
same fashion.245 The result is that in these states with strong pension-
protecting constitutional norms, until these strong constitutional sec-
tions are amended or repealed, the policy choices available to state
legislatures and executives will be restricted by the language and the
interpretation of the state's constitution.2 46With the observed decline
in the utility of Contracts Clause attacks on pension reforms, these
aspects of state constitutional law will take on even greater impor-
242. See Fields v. Elected Officials' Ret. Plan, 320 P.3d 1160, 1164-65 (Ariz. 2014) (Pension
Clause confers additional, independent protection beyond the Contract Clause). This has been a
much-litigated issue in Illinois with the protection of the Illinois Constitution's pension protec-
tion clause being found to apply only when the employee has "entered the [retirement] system."
Konicki v. Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund, No. 4-17-0056, 2018 Ill. App. (4th) 170056-U, at *18 (Mar. 2,
2018).
243. A number of other states have reached the same policy position by statute. See Ky. Rev.
St. §61.692(1) (finding public pension rights for pre-2014 employees to constitute an "inviolable
contract" and that benefits shall not be subject to reduction or impairment by alteration, amend-
ment, or repeal.); Wis. Stat. §40.19(1) (shall be due as a contractual right and shall not be abro-
gated by any subsequent legislative act for accrued benefits).
244. Ill. Const., art. XIII, §5. See also N.Y. Const., art. V, §7 ("membership in any pension or
retirement system... shall be a contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be dimin-
ished or impaired"). Illinois courts have actively enforced this clause. See generally Jones v. Mun.
Emps.' Annuity & Ben. Fund of Chi., 50 N.E.3d 596 (Ill. 2016); Matthews v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
51 N.E.3d 753 (Ill. 2016); Heaton v. Quinn (In re Pension Reform Litigation), 32 N.E.3d 1 (I1l.
2015); Kanerva v. Weems, 13 N.E.3d 1228 (Ill. 2014).
245. Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Alaska 1981). See generally Mun. of
Anchorage v. Gallion, 944 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1997); Yeazell v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541 (Ariz. 1965).
246. See In re Pension Reform Litigation, 32 N.E.3d 1, 98 (Ill. 2015) (statute lowering pen-
sion benefits declared unconstitutional under state pension protection clause).
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tance as a crucial protector of public employee pension rights in the
states having this law.
VI. CONCLUSION: HAVE THE COURTS PROTECTED
PENSION RIGHTS THAT LEGISLATURES HAVE
ATTEMPTED TO CUT?
The subject of this article is a difficult one asking how to reconcile
the competing interests of public employees against the larger interest
of state and local governments and their taxpaying citizens. On the
purely economic level, this conffict could be characterized as an ordi-
nary struggle between two competing constituencies attempting to de-
termine who should bear the deferred cost of service. But this is more
than a tussle between employers and their workers since these em-
ployees are people who serve us as our teachers, police, fire-fighters,
first responders and others providing critical services for long periods,
sometimes for their entire working lives. While public worker salaries
do vary, in general they support a modest, middle class existence for
people who work every day.24 7 The recently-adopted pension reforms
have created great anxiety about the future in these workers striking a
visceral chord - will I have stable retirement income? How will I live
when I can no longer work? These are critically important issues for
all people, but they are even more significant for modestly-paid public
workers.
This is also a story about competing misunderstandings both on
the part of public workers and of the government employers. Em-
ployees frequently believed that they had earned stable retirement in-
come through their work and they strongly felt that once earned,
these "rights" were permanent and not subject to later reduction.
This was a hopeful belief that drove workers' groups to court to de-
fend their perceived rights. It is also a tale about government leaders'
misunderstandings of the implications of employee work agreements
and pension promises. Over many years, retirement benefits have
been offered with little serious consideration of their long-term costs.
247. In May, 2017 the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics set the average annual salary for all
local government employees at $52,980 and the average state worker salary at $55,820. See U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, Occupational Employment Statistics, Local Government, NAICS 999300;
State Government, NAICS 999200 (May, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/oes/2017/may/naics4_9993
00.htm. Some teacher annual teacher salaries for 2016-17 were far less than these averages:
South Dakota ($42,668), Mississippi ($42,925), Oklahoma ($45,245), and West Virginia
($45,701). See NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, 2017 Tables and Figures, Table
211.60, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d17/tables/dtl7_211.60.asp.
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The granting of benefits without providing for their actual payment
also reveals a willful ignorance of the economic consequences of prior
promises. As history shows us, it is easy for politicians to make current
promises that will have to be honored by others in the future.
Both of these misunderstandings (or policy errors) have led to the
pension "reforms" that have recently been adopted. In every instance,
government policy changed employee benefits in a way that was ad-
verse to workers' interests usually at times of fiscal stress and after the
precise costs of providing existing benefits had become better under-
stood. These episodes also demonstrate another theme of the eroding
public support for funding the true costs of state and local government
services.4 8 The reform of pension systems for fiscal reasons has suc-
ceeded in state legislatures following the usual democratic process
with the citizens giving tactic approval. It is not clear that these cut
backs are the result of any deep animus towards state and local work-
ers but rather they reflect an increased resistance to higher taxation to
fund the existing pension system.2 49 This anti-tax trend and shifting
support against public employees have recently triggered a backlash
from some public workers that has occasionally been successful.
250
248. Media portrayals of abusive and unreasonable public employee pension practices in
some parts of the country have harmed public perceptions of worker entitlement to their retire-
ment benefits even though these episodes distort average public worker's conduct See, e.g., Jan
Hefler, "Double Dipping"- Collecting a Government Pension and Salary Banned in Burlington
County, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, (September 30, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/
politics/20160930 _Double dipping- collecting-a-government-pension and-salary-_banned
in BurlingtonCounty.html; Editorial, Audit Port Authority for Pension Scams-And while
we're at it, New Jersey, STAR LEDGER, (June 27, 2016), https://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/
2016/06/auditportauthorityforpension scams and whilew.html; Mary Williams Walsh and
Amy Schoenfeld, Padded Pensions Add to New York Fiscal Woes, N.Y. TIMES, (May 21, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/business/economy/21pension.html. See also, Pisani v. City of
Springfield, No. 4-16-0417, 2017 Il. App. LEXIS 113, *8-9 (App. Ct. Mar. 3, 2017) (upholding
city policy against use of vacation leave to "spike" pensions).
249. Although public attitudes towards the federal government have declined, state and local
governments score consistently higher on surveys of favorability. See generally, State Govern-
ments Viewed Favorably as Federal Rating Hits New Low, PEw RESEARCH CTR. (2013), http://
www.people-press.org/2013/04/15/state-govermnents-viewed-favorably-as-federal-rating-hits-
new-low/; Republicans Like State Government, Especially in GOP-Led States: Growing Gap in
Favorable Views of Federal, State Governments PEw RESEARCH CTR. (2012), http://www.people-
press.org/2012/04/26/growing-gap-in-favorable-views-of-federal-state-governments/.
250. Michael Hansen, Hidden Factors Contributing to Teacher Strikes in Oklahoma and West
Virginia, and Beyond, Brown Center Chalkboard, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2018/04/06/hidden-factors-contribu
ting-to-teacher-strikes-in-oklahoma-kentucky-and-beyond/. See also Danielle Haynes, Teacher
Strikes Highlight Widening U.S. Pay Gap, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (Apr. 12,2018), https:/
/www.upi.com/Teacher-strikes-highlight-widening-US-pay-gap/1091523033985/ (describing low
teacher pay and 9 days strikes in Oklahoma and West Virginia).
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As a reaction to their failure in the legislative and administrative
arena, public employees have asked federal and state courts to moder-
ate the impacts of these reform policies through judicial review. In
order to do this, employee groups have had to prove that their
"rights" to the affected pension system benefits have been unlawfully
damaged. In cases where states have had strong constitutional protec-
tions for pension benefits or when state statutes undeniably limited
government retrenchment of existing rights, the courts have been will-
ing to rebuff the policy changes. However, when asked to "stretch"
the meaning of statutes or prior interpretive precedent to block these
reforms, most often courts have said "no."25' Interestingly, this has
been especially true with regard to claims based upon constitutional
rights theory where judicial interpretation and the exercise of discre-
tion have rarely been exercised in favor of workers or retirees.2 Per-
haps all this reveals is that retirement claims have been considered
economic in nature and not protected by stronger constitutional or
statutory norms.
Judges have been extremely reluctant to intervene into what they
perceive as a socio-economic conflict between employees and their
employer. Such non-interventionist judicial attitudes have been con-
sistent with the majoritarian decisions made by elected officials. These
courts have also been very careful not to challenge the authority of
the legislature and with their narrow rulings they have protected
themselves from "activism" criticism.253 The clear import of this anal-
ysis has been that public workers must look to the political process for
protection of their work-related rights- and not to the courts.254 These
251. Some exceptions do exist, and some state supreme courts have made expansive readings
of state pension rights statutes. See, e.g., Milwaukee Police Ass'n. v. Milwaukee, No.
2015AP2375, 2018 Wisc. LEXIS 314 (July 6, 2018) (stating that city home rule power does not
include the city's authority to change employee voting or representation on Annuity and Pension
Board protected as "other rights" under state statute).
252. Compare demanding judicial review of state legislative restrictions on the exercise of
public employee First Amendment constitutional rights.
253. Perhaps state courts are less inclined to challenge legislative choices perceiving legisla-
tures to be more willing to cut back on the judicial role. See, e.g., Legislative Assaults on State
Courts 2018, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSUCE (Feb. 6,2018) https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/
legislative-assaults-state-courts-2018 (Legislatures in at least 16 states considering legislation that
would diminish the role or independence of state courts); Editorial, Courts Shouldn't be Partisan
Punching Bags, N.Y. TimEs, (Apr. 9,2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/opinion/judicial
-independence.html.
254. There was no completely uniform pattern in all case decision and a small number of
state courts like Arizona and Illinois clearly demonstrated a pro-worker/retiree emphasis.
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employees must build public understanding, appreciation, and support
for the important work that they do. Litigating to overcome legisla-
tive defeats is ultimately a losing game.
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